The Auditor for the Auditors\u27 Auditor: Accounting for the Unitary Executive in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board by Stapler, Kelsey Elizabeth
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 38 | Issue 3 Article 3
3-15-2011
The Auditor for the Auditors' Auditor: Accounting
for the Unitary Executive in Free Enterprise Fund v.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
Kelsey Elizabeth Stapler
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kelsey Elizabeth Stapler The Auditor for the Auditors' Auditor: Accounting for the Unitary Executive in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board, 38 Pepp. L. Rev. 3 (2011)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/3
The Auditor for the Auditors'
Auditor: Accounting for the Unitary
Executive in Free Enterprise Fund v.
Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board
I. INTRODUCTION
II. BACKGROUND: PRESIDENTS AND PRECEDENT
A. Executive and Legislative Tension Over Removal Powers
1. Removal Power Limitations for Quasi-Legislative or
Quasi-Judicial Officers
2. Removal Power Limitations for Purely Executive
Officers
B. Legislative and Executive Tension Over the Appointments
Clause
1. Appointment Power Over Independent Agencies
2. Definitions for Appointable "Principal Officers"
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW: FREE ENTERPRISE AND THE PCAOB
A. Purpose and Structure of the PCAOB
B. Constitutional Analysis of the PCAOB: The Free Enterprise
Case
1. Removal Power Arguments
2. Appointment Power Arguments
IV. RECONCILING THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE WITH CONGRESSIONAL
INTENTIONS FOR THE PCAOB
A. The Supreme Court's Decision Did Not Resolve the Issue of
Executive Control Over the Board
B. Independence of the PCAOB Leaves Room for Executive
Control
C. Congress Mistakenly Rejected Alternative Designs
1. Independent Agency Status
2. Sub-Agency Status
D. Precedent and Policy Arguments Support Executive
Control of the PCAOB
1. Increase in Voter Confidence




The most directly democratic branch of government does not make
decisions by vote. It does not negotiate for one geographic constituency. In
its pure form, the Executive Branch is perhaps "the most accessible,
politically accountable force in government at the local, state, and national
levels"' because it vests the law's execution in the administration of one
man. 2 The President rises or falls by the success of his policies.' The same
mechanisms that ensure this accountability, however, also create an equal
and opposite fear of tyrannical opacity.4 The Executive's built-in discretion
1. Judy Coleman, Introduction to Symposium, The Most Dangerous Branch? Mayors,
Governors, Presidents, and the Rule ofLaw, 115 YALE L.J. 2215, 2216 (2006). The founding fathers
recognized this aspect of the Executive during the ratification debates. See RICHARD BEEMAN,
PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 128-29 (2010). James
Wilson of Pennsylvania provided a key voice in support of a single Executive. Id. He argued that a
president directly elected by the population would possess the strongest incentive to give energy and
direction to the national government. Id Echoing this perspective, modem day supporters of the
unitary Executive note that the Executive remains the most nationally minded political branch, in
stark contrast to the constituency-driven special interests threading through the decisions of the
Legislative Branch. See, e.g., DAVID KAIRYS, THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
606 (1998).
2. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 197 (2005); see also
Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23
(1995). Renowned unitary executive theorist Steven Calabresi describes this particular strength of
the Executive through comparative analysis of the electoral process:
The collective action problem exists because most of the constituencies might be better
off with less largesse and lower levels of taxation, borrowing, and regulation. But no
member of Congress will dare vote for this absent an effective mechanism of collective
enforcement for fear that other members of Congress will cheat and will continue to steer
national pork to their local interests. The only official with any incentive under our
present electoral structure to stop this game is the President who is (along with the Vice
President) our only nationally elected official. Representing as he does a national
electoral college majority, the President at least has an incentive to steer national
resources toward the 51% of the nation that last supported him (and that might support
him again), thereby mitigating the bad distributional incentives faced by members of
Congress.
Calabresi, supra, at 35. James Madison described the executive power as "restrained within a
narrower compass, and being more simple in its nature" than the Legislative Branch due to its
compact size and accountability. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 332-38 (James Madison) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961).
3. Calabresi, supra note 2, at 35.
4. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 2, at 471-80 (Alexander Hamilton). In this
Federalist Paper, Hamilton defends the unitary Executive for its energy and accountability. Id. Even
as he wrote in favor of the structure, Hamilton acknowledged that "[t]here is an idea, which is not
without its advocates, that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican
government." Id. This fear stemmed from the belief that a single Executive could become
tyrannical without the transparency of multiple counselors. BEEMAN, supra note 1, at 127-28. Yet,
Hamilton continues, these dissenters "must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of
foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the
condemnation of their own principles. Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the
definition of good government." Id. As he noted in The Federalist No. 67, there is "hardly any part
of the system which could have been attended with greater difficulty in the arrangement of it than
[the Executive Branch]; and there is, perhaps, none which has been . . . criticised with less
judgment." THE FEDERALIST No. 67, supra note 2, at 452-57 (Alexander Hamilton).
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ultimately leads to a tension between public trust and distrust of the Branch.'
The modem administrative state brings this tension to its breaking
point.6 The unitary executive philosophy exalts executive discretion,
believing the Constitution formally vests the President with exclusive power
to execute the laws, which in turn provides energy and accountability. 7
Critics of the unitary Executive argue that functionally, the Constitution's
separation of powers only provides accountability when the President's
discretionary executive power is nonexclusive and tempered by legislative
and judicial involvement.' Today's era of complex, expansive federal
5. The power of the Executive stands alone among the branches as the most ambivalent and
discretionary. U.S. CONST. art. II; see also supra notes 4, 5 and accompanying text. See generally
HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, TAMING THE PRINCE: THE AMBIVALENCE OF MODERN EXECUTIVE POWER
(1993).
6. "Administrative state" meaning post-New Deal bureaucracy. See Saikrishna B. Prakash,
Hail to the ChiefAdministrator: The Framers and the President's Administrative Powers, 102 YALE
L.J. 991, 991 (1993). The debate over the unitary Executive can only practically exist so long as the
Executive has the power to remain unitary. At least in administration, the endurance of this power
has come into question with the rise of fully insulated independent agencies. See supra Parts III, IV.
Since the New Deal, and even before, the powerful simplicity of the presidency has been replaced
with a flexible arrangement of departments, agencies, and oversight committees all intending to
enforce a wide expanse of federal regulation. See Calabresi, supra note 2, at 30-31, 50. For more
on how this development has impacted separation of powers, see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,
694 (1988) ("'While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates
that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity."' (quoting Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (concurring opinion)). But see Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986) (striking down congressional Comptroller); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
958 (1983) (striking down legislative veto).
7. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § I ("The executive power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America."); STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. Yoo, THE UNITARY
EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 3-4 (2008) [hereinafter
PRESIDENTIAL POWER]; Gary Lawson, Changing Images of the State: The Rise and Rise of the
Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1242 (1994). Calabresi defines the unitary Executive
by the three explicit powers: "the President's power of removal; the President's power to direct
subordinate executive officials' exercises of discretionary executive power; and the President's
power to nullify or veto subordinate executive officials' exercises of discretionary executive power."
Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century, 47
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451, 1458 (1997) [hereinafter The Unitary Executive]. The President's
appointment power also falls under the hearing of unitary powers, though it is defined by a different
constitutional provision. See id. at 1458 n.23.
8. Calabresi identifies four primary complaints voiced by Anti-Presidentialists (using the term
to describe those who oppose the unitary executive philosophy): first, that the presidency has
become too "imperial" through the subversion of checks and balances by executive orders; second,
that the presidency has amassed a sweeping network of administrative powers due to bureaucratic
delegation; third, that the President has too much unilateral control over foreign policy and war-
making; and fourth, that the President is too easily able to politicize law enforcement and thus
insulate himself from public scrutiny. Calabresi, supra note 2, at 30-31. These arguments are used
to justify or even require the creation of more independent agencies and counsels combined with
more aggressive judicial review of executive actions. Id.; see also Charles N. Steele & Jeffrey H.
Bowman, The Constitutionality of Independent Regulatory Agencies Under the Necessary and
Proper Clause: The Case of the Federal Election Commission, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 363 (1987). The
debate between these two camps has continued for decades, primarily constrained to the pages of
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government condenses the debate to a single question: Regardless of form or
function, who is ultimately responsible to the voters when regulation goes
wrong?
Currently, there is one particular field of regulation that can facilitate
this debate and respond to its ultimate inquiry.9 Due to Congress's actions
on the subject, the area of securities regulation raises unique constitutional
issues and offers a chance to examine the practical impact of limiting or
expanding executive authority.'o Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
in the wake of financial scandals and securities fraud that emerged in the late
1990s." The "sweeping reform"' 2 of the Act focused on six main areas of
securities regulation: creating the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board ("PCAOB" or "the Board"), strengthening public company auditor
independence, regulating corporate governance and responsibility,
enhancing financial disclosure, regulating securities analyst conflicts of
interest, and adding several new substantive securities crimes while
enhancing penalties for violations.'" With the creation of the PCAOB,14 the
academia. The Unitary Executive, supra note 7, at 1452-57.
9. Economic policy is ripe for this discussion because it directly impacts the lives of nearly all
voters and is, thus, most easily generalized. See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT P.
THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY 1-8 (1973). In
particular, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act offers a recent and expansive example of such policy. See Public
Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes-Oxley) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-66). As will be discussed, the Act's
particular introduction of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB" or "the
Board") ties together a discussion of the unitary Executive and government accountability. See infra
Part III.
10. See infra Parts III, IV.
11. Congress acknowledged this when it first enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. See John
W. Cioffi, Irresistible Forces and Political Obstacles: Securities Litigation Reform and the
Structural Regulation of Corporate Governance 28 (Comparative Research in Law & Political
Econ., Research Paper No. 7/2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstractid=902648. The legislation
was designed to reform the system of securities regulation in response to a wave of financial
scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and others. Id For a discussion of the reform intended by
Sarbanes-Oxley, see id. For more references to the financial scandals, see Geoffrey C. Rapp,
Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud
Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REv. 91, 94-95 (2007).
12. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform
(And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REv. 915, 917 n.5 (2003) ("Scores of news stories used the
phrase 'sweeping reform' and compared the Act, using the same words its champions did, to the
New Deal era's enactment of the original securities laws, the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . ... The president of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants ("AICPA") said the Act 'contains some of the most far-reaching changes that Congress
has ever introduced to the business world."').
13. Rapp, supra note II, at 95 n.16. By casting such a broad net of new regulation, Congress has
been criticized for creating a costly, confusing complex of laws. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Sarbanes-Oxley: Legislating in Haste, Repenting in Leisure 2 (UCLA Law & Econ. Research Paper
Series, Paper No. 06-14, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=899593 ("[Congress] threw a
bunch of ideas into a single basket and rushed it into law so that angry investors would blame
somebody-anybody-other than Congress for the stock market bubble's bursting and the corporate
governance scandals."); Cunningham, supra note 12, at 918-19 ("Apart from sweeping punts and
stunts, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act reenacts in a new federal guise more than a dozen existing federal
regulations, state laws, stock exchange and securities industry rules, accounting or auditing practices,
and corporate governance norms. These codifications do little more than shine a spotlight on some
712
[Vol. 38: 709, 20111 The Auditor for the Auditors'Auditor
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Act presents an opportunity to reexamine the administrative state and answer
the basic question of who will be held responsible if or when this next wave
of reform goes wrong." To answer this question, it is necessary to evaluate
the constitutionality and usefulness of entities like the Board.'6
The PCAOB stands at the crossroads of executive branch authority and
congressional oversight. Congress charges the PCAOB with overseeing "the
audit of public companies that are subject to the securities laws, and related
matters, in order to protect the interests of investors and further the public
interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit
reports for companies the securities of which are sold to .. . public
investors."' 7  It is a quasi-private agency," vested with a wide range of
best practices, an important function but hardly reform of any sort, sweeping or otherwise.
Incremental provisions of the Act are best seen as patchwork responses to precise transgressions
present in the popularized scandals . . . .").
14. It is important to note that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not have a "severability clause" for
its individual sections. Thus, prior to the Supreme Court decision, it was possible that legal
challenges to the PCAOB could have resulted in striking down the entire law. See Sarbanes-Oxley
on Trial, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI000142405274870410710457
4571662869948676.html; Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 10. The respondents for the PCAOB argued
that severability was still an option:
Even absent a severability clause, "the unconstitutional provision[s] [of a statute] must be
severed unless the statute created in [their] absence is legislation that Congress would not
have enacted." Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685-686 (1987). Given the
crisis Congress confronted, it is inconceivable that Congress would have declined to
enact Sarbanes-Oxley if it could not have included a removal limitation.
Brief for Respondents Public Company Accounting Oversight Board at 48-49, Free Enter. Fund v.
Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (No 08-861), 2009 WL 3327230, at
*48-49 [hereinafter Brief for Respondents]. Their arguments prevailed, and the Supreme Court
severed the removability portion from the rest of the statute. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3161
("[T]he existence of the Board does not violate the separation of powers, but the substantive removal
restrictions ... do.").
15. This question may indicate a rather pessimistic view of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but it is not
without basis. Commentators have begun to suggest that the Act is more costly than beneficial and,
as will be discussed in this Comment, potentially unconstitutional. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note
13, at 7-15; James Freeman, The Supreme Case Against Sarbanes-Oxley, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15,
2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704431804574539921864252380.html.
16. See infra Parts III, IV.
17. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (2006).
18. The public/private status of the Board is not clearly defined within the Act. Functionally, the
Board is an independent government agency. Formalistically, the members of the Board are not
government employees. As Professor Donna Nagy explains:
Notwithstanding its governmental creation, its governmental objectives, its governmental
powers and privileges, and its governmentally appointed board members, Congress
established the PCAOB as a private, not-for-profit corporation. Congress's determination
to situate the PCAOB in the private sector could not have been clearer. In a section
entitled "status," the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides that "[t]he Board shall not be an
agency or establishment of the United States Government" and that "[n]o member or
person employed by, or agent for, the Board shall be deemed to be an officer or employee
of or agent for the Federal Government by reason of such service." The PCAOB's
public/private status renders its sardonic nickname "peekaboo" more than a bit profound.
Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private
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powers, including power to create rules, investigate compliance, and impose
substantial fines for violations of its rules.' 9 To put it simply, "[t]he PCAOB
is now, without question, the congressionally designated auditor for
auditors." 20 Members of the PCAOB are not appointed by the President 2'
but rather appointed solely by the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC" or "the Commission").22 Congress fully intended the insulation, as
one senator noted: "Anybody who thinks this board is just going to slap
around a few accountants does not understand this bill. This board is going
to have massive power, unchecked power, by design." 23
This unrestrained power eventually triggered the lawsuit of Free
Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board considered by
the Supreme Court at the end of the 2009 term.24 In 2006, Free Enterprise
Fund25 joined with Beckstead and Watts LLP 26 to bring a facial challenge to
Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 975, 978 (2005). Despite the Board's ambiguity, Supreme Court
precedent indicates it is most likely a government agency for constitutional purposes. See Lebron v.
Nat'l R.R. Passenger, 513 U.S. 374, 394 (1995) (defining AMTRAK as a government agency for
constitutional purpose despite a congressional declaration that the train service would not be a
government agency). In Lebron, the Supreme Court held, "[Wihere, as here, the Government
creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance of governmental objectives, and retains for
itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation, the corporation is
part of the Government for purposes of the First Amendment." Id at 400. The PCAOB fits this
definition, and the parties in Free Enterprise stipulated to this fact. See also Nagy, supra, at 982;
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., No. 06-0217, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24310, at *10-11 (D.D.C. 2007), afd, 537 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), affd in part, rev'd in part,
and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) ("The parties agree that, at least for purposes of these
motions, PCAOB should be considered a governmental entity, and so it shall be.").
19. Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 7. The Board is empowered to create audit procedures and
policies, register public accounting firms, maintain standards concerning audit reports, as well as
oversight, discipline and sanctioning of public accounting firms. Cunningham, supra note 12, at
943.
20. Nagy, supra note 18, at 978.
21. See U.S. CONST. art 2, § 2. The Appointments Clause grants the following to the President:
[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate,
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which
shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in
the Heads of Departments.
Id.
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 7211.
23. 148 CONG. REc. S6334 (daily ed. July 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Phil Gramm). Former
Senator Phil Gramm (TX-R) served as Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee from 1999-2001
and was succeeded in that position by Paul Sarbanes, who served from 2001-2002. See UNITED
STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, & URBAN AFFAIRS, History of the Chairmen
of the Senate Banking Committee, http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.
View&FileStoreid=bc9f496c-7777-44b0-bd2e-4989fb0663d6 (last visited Jan. 8, 2011). Sen.
Gramm worked closely with Sen. Sarbanes during the creation of the PCAOB. See 148 CONG. REC.
S6333-34 (daily ed. July 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Phil Gramm).
24. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct.
3138 (2010) (No. 08-861).
25. "The Free Enterprise Fund is a non-profit, 501(c)(4) organization focusing on limited
government and tax relief." FREE ENTERPRISE FUND, http://fefund.org/pagel.aspx (last visited Jan.
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the constitutionality of the PCAOB.27 They argued that the structure of the
PCAOB violates separation of powers guaranteed by the Executive's
appointments and removal powers within Article II of the Constitution.28
In a five-to-four decision,29 the Supreme Court held in favor of Free
Enterprise, ruling that, though the PCAOB itself was constitutional, its
members could not be removable only "for cause" without infringing on the
President's removal powers in Article 11.30 The Court also held, however,
that the Board's members acted as "inferior officers" who could be
appointed by the SEC without infringing on the President's appointment
powers in Article I.31
Though it rendered a final decision on the constitutionality of the
Board,3 2 the Court's decision failed to establish any bright line for the
constitutional role of independent agencies under the President's control.33
The Free Enterprise case ultimately provides little guidance for future action
in similar cases.34 And as a result, analysis of the PCAOB should not stop
with the Supreme Court's decision. Instead, to avoid a repeat of such
costly and relatively unproductive litigation, Congress should recognize
problems with the Board and perhaps find a way to improve it through the
use of executive oversight. 36  The Board enforces regulation; the unitary
8, 2011).
26. An accounting firm subject to the jurisdiction of the PCAOB.
27. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., No. 06-0217, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24310, at *6-7 (D.D.C. 2007), affd, 537 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). The D.C. District Court and the D.C. Circuit Court
both held that the PCAOB did not violate separation of powers, but the Supreme Court to granted
certiorari to resolve this issue of first impression. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note
24, at 7 ("At every level, it is clear that this Court's review is warranted. The issues presented go to
the heart of the relationship between the Legislative and Executive Branches and all agree that this is
a 'case of first impression' (Pet. App. 26a) because it involves a wholly unprecedented model for
federal agencies"). The Supreme Court handed down its ruling in the case in June 2010. Free Enter.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010); see also infra Part III.
28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. See infra Part III for an explanation of the suit and the arguments of
each side.
29. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion with the support of Justices Scalia, Thomas,
Kennedy, and Alito. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3146. Justice Breyer penned the dissenting
opinion in which Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor joined. Id. at 3164 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
30. Id. at 3161 (majority opinion).
31. Id. at 3162.
32. Id at 3161 (noting that the Board will continue to exist though the Court ruled its members
can no longer be removable only "for cause").
33. See infra Part IV; see also Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3177 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(arguing the majority failed to define when an Executive Branch worker's duties qualify him as an
"inferior officer" that cannot be insulated with double for-cause removal limitations).
34. See infra Part IV.
35. See infra Part IV.
36. See infra Parts III, IV.
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executive doctrine suggests the President holds executive power and should
have direct control over enforcement functions.37 This Comment will argue
that, in light of the Free Enterprise case, the unitary executive doctrine
should inspire Congress's reconsideration of the PCAOB, and agencies
similar to it, because the Board's functions will be more accountable and
more effective under executive leadership.
Part II of this Comment presents a brief history of the unitary executive
view as well as Supreme Court precedent shaping the issue.39 Part III
addresses the current state of law defined by Free Enterprise as well as the
purpose behind the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the PCAOB.40 Part IV analyzes
problems with the PCAOB and discusses how separation of powers and the
unitary executive doctrine would work to encourage transparency and
accountability for the PCAOB.41 Part V concludes this Comment with final
thoughts on the issues at stake in the structure of the PCAOB.42
II. BACKGROUND: PRESIDENTS AND PRECEDENT
Each American president has utilized aspects of the unitary Executive,
whether in leadership style or in exercises of power.43 Even so, the concept
of a single Executive did not universally appeal to the public at the time of
the Constitution's ratification."4  The Founders offered three basic
arguments in favor of a strong Executive: he would infuse the government
with energy,45  ensure straightforward accountability,46 and protect the
37. See infra Part II.
38. See infra Part III, IV. Of course, this goal is purely normative and is proposed with the
understanding that genuine legislative support of a broad view of executive power is very unlikely.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 2, at 349 (James Madison) (noting that separation of
powers allows ambition to counteract ambition, motivating each branch to resist the encroachment of
others). As will be discussed infra, however, Congress might eventually find that by allowing the
President to control executive functions, they may, in fact, receive credit from the voters for their
successful policymaking.
39. See infra Part II.
40. See infra Part III.
41. See infra Part IV.
42. See infra Part V.
43. PRESIDENTIAL POWER, supra note 7, at 4.
44. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, supra note 2, at 452-57 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton
recognized that many opponents of the Constitution used the people's fear of monarchical tyranny to
sway them against the idea of a unitary Executive. See id As he wrote in The Federalist No. 67:
Here the writers against the Constitution seem to have taken pains to signalize their talent
of misrepresentation. Calculating upon the aversion of the people to monarchy, they
have endeavored to enlist all their jealousies and apprehensions in opposition to the
intended President of the United States; not merely as the embryo, but as the full-grown
progeny, of that detested parent.
Id.
45. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton argued that energy in the
Executive is "leading character in the definition of good government." Id. For an in-depth
discussion of this view, see Calabresi, supra note 2, at 37-39.
46. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70, supra note 2 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton explains that
more than one executive would decrease responsibility and allow the passage of blame from one
executive to the next. Id. at 479-80. However, it is important to note that constitutionalism, as
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Executive Branch from infringement by the legislature.47 These arguments
ultimately prevailed, and Article II of the Constitution emerged. 48  Beyond
just their historical importance, though, these arguments of energy,
accountability, and separation of powers have shaped the modem debate
over the unitary Executive.49
The unitary Executive derives from the words of Article II, which
provide that "the executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America."o Unlike the enumerated powers of Article I,"I
the powers granted in Article II are not meant to be an exhaustive list.52
Instead, the vesting words of Article II give the President "a residuum of
general authority . ... And though a cabinet of advisors assists the
President in his duties, Article II ultimately holds the President responsible
for the law's faithful execution.54 Particularly relevant to the issue at hand,
advocated by Hamilton, does not assume one executive will submit to accountability to the people
out of the goodness of his heart. See MANSFIELD, supra note 5, at 185-211. Instead, his
accountability is born out of necessity. See id. Mansfield explains:
Modem constitutionalism begins from Aristotle's, or any philosopher's, observation that
the claims of justice made by regimes are partisan. But rather than argue with such
claims in order to improve them, modem constitutionalism forces the claimants to
abandon their partisanship by confronting necessity. Necessity as revealed in the state of
nature will compel partisans to consider what is essential, their self-preservation, and to
forsake their partisan opinions about the good or godly life.
Id. at 185.
47. See Calabresi, supra note 2, at 37. In The Federalist, Madison and Hamilton both forcefully
advocated a strong separation of powers within the federal branches so that the political ambitions of
men in one branch would counteract the political ambitions of men in another. See, e.g., THE
FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 2, at 347-53 (James Madison). Madison also recognized that in a
republic government, the Legislature would necessarily be the strongest branch and would therefore
need an invigorated Executive to check the ambitions of its members. See id.
48. U.S. CoNST. art. II.
49. See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Unitary Executive in a Unified Theory of Constitutional Law:
The Problem ofInterpretation, 15 CARDOzO L. REv. 201, 201-02 (1993).
50. U.S. CONST. art. II.
51. U.S. CONST. art. I. Cf U.S. CONST. amend. X (granting to the states all powers not
expressly given to Congress).
52. AMAR, supra note 2, at 133. Congress's powers are enumerated, while the President is
simply given a general power of execution. Id
53. Id.; see also, PRESIDENTIAL POWER, supra note 7, at 4 ("The president's powers go beyond
those specifically enumerated in Article II, Sections 2 and 3, and include at least some implied,
residual executive powers like the removal power, as well.").
54. See AMAR, supra note 2, at 197 ("What Article II did make emphatically clear from start to
finish was that the president would be personally responsible for his branch. Though he would be
aided by subordinates in discharging his many and varied functions, the Constitution took pains to
disavow the idea of a collective cabinet or directory behind whom he might hide . . . . Article II
required the president alone to openly nominate his candidates, enabling the public to assess the
nominator while the Senate assessed the nominees."). One of the original congressmen, James
Wilson, described this arrangement as an eye witness to its implementation:
In the United States, our first executive magistrate is not obnubilated behind the
mysterious obscurity of counsellors. Power is communicated to him with liberality,
though with ascertained limitations. To him the provident or improvident use of it is to be
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the Constitution also gives the President power to appoint "principle
officers."55 According to the Appointments Clause, the President
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 6
The Appointments Clause also implies the President's power to remove
these officers. 7  This clause, combined with the President's duty to "take
care that the Laws be faithfully executed,"'58 provides the foundation for
presidential authority and the theory of the unitary Executive. 59
A. Executive and Legislative Tension Over Removal Powers60
The powers granted by the Appointments Clause create a key
battleground for the Executive and Legislative Branches.6 ' The President's
ascribed. For the first, he will have and deserve undivided applause. For the last, he will
be subjected to censure; if necessary, to punishment. He is the dignified, but accountable
magistrate of a free and great people.
1 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 319 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967); see
also Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 712-13 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment)
(recognizing the President "cannot delegate ultimate responsibility or the active obligation to
supervise that goes with it" because Article II "makes a single President responsible for the actions
of the Executive Branch"); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138,
3154 (2010).
55. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976).
56. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
57. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (holding in favor of the President's
independent removal power but later limited by Humphrey's to apply only to executive agencies).
C.f Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627-29 (1935) (upholding the President's
removal power of independent agency officials subject to "specific cause" limitations set by
Congress).
58. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
59. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994).
60. In the Free Enterprise case, the D.C. Circuit used "separation of powers" to describe tension
between the Legislative and Executive Branches over the President's control of agencies,
particularly in his ability to remove officers. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 678-79, 689-93 (D.C. Cir. 2008), affd in part, rev'd in part, and
remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010), 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010); Julian Helisek, The Fault, Dear PCAOB,
Lies Not in the Appointments Clause, but in the Removal Power, That You Are Unconstitutional, 77
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1063, 1070-71 (2009). However, "separation of powers" in this Comment will
refer more generally to preservation of executive power through the powers of appointment and
removal. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. Miller, supra note 49, at 204 ("The principal battleground between the executive and
legislative branches under the system of separation of powers is the power to control the
administrative state.").
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authority to remove officers at his discretion directly conflicts with
Congress's creation of the so-called "Fourth Branch" 62-independent
agencies insulated from the President's discretionary removal.6 ' This
"headless"" branch first surfaced as federal government power grew
exponentially during the New Deal era.65
1. Removal Power Limitations for Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-
Judicial Officers
President Franklin Roosevelt developed a new breed of administration
energized by politicalization.66  Yet, even though FDR is credited with
founding the "modern activist state,"67 the open structure of his many
administrative agencies allowed him to retain the power of decision. He
preserved this power in part by asserting his ability to remove officers for
any cause. President Roosevelt predicated his removal power on the
Supreme Court's decision in Myers v. United States, which upheld the
President's power to remove the same officers he had the power to
appoint. 0 Yet, as FDR's executive power expanded, Congress began to
62. For use of this term in greater context, see Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in
Government: Separation ofPowers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 578 (1984).
63. See id. at 607 (noting that presidential control stems substantially from the President's ability
to remove officers who do not support or advance his agenda).
64. THE PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 30 (1937).
65. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 279 (1998). Ackerman draws a
connection between the ideas of the Founders and the extent of their natural consequences found
within the New Deal. Id. He notes:
[Tihe Founding precedent can usefully put the New Deal into historical perspective. But
the salient similarities are noticeable only on a wider canvas. As in the 1780's, so in the
1930's, a relatively nationalistic group of revolutionary reformers refused to play by the
old higher lawmaking rules-without, however, utterly obliterating the institutional
matrix that had previously organized political life. As in the 1780's, so in the 1930's, the
reformers created new legitimating patterns out of older institutional materials-finally
earning the credibility needed to make new higher law in the name of We the People. As
in the 1780's, so in the 1930's, their accelerating institutional bandwagon proceeded from
a signaling phase through a series of appeals to the People at the polls to a period of
consolidation. In all these senses-and more-the New Deal revolution carried forward
the Founders' unconventional experiment in popular sovereignty into the twentieth
century.
Id.
66. PRESIDENTIAL POWER, supra note 7, at 278.
67. ACKERMAN, supra note 65, at 279.
68. PRESIDENTIAL POWER, supra note 7, at 279.
69. See id
70. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 119 (1926) ("The view of Mr. Madison and his
associates was that not only did the grant of executive power to the President in the first section of
article 2 carry with it the power of removal, but the express recognition of the power of appointment
in the second section enforced this view on the well-approved principle of constitutional and
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assert its own control over the new administrative structure .71  The tension
between the Executive and Legislative Branches came to a head in the
Supreme Court decision of Humphrey's Executor v. United States.72 The
decision openly suppressed Roosevelt's power of decision. Up until 1935,
FDR had worked without opposition to establish his administrative network
and to assert complete executive control over its officers through the
appointment and removal power upheld in Myers.74  In Humphrey's
Executor, however, the Supreme Court short-circuited President Roosevelt's
unitary agenda. 5 Distinguishing Myers almost into oblivion, the Court
statutory construction that the power of removal of executive officers was incident to the power of
appointment."). The Court also explained how the removal power was tied directly to the basic
executive power, noting:
The power of removal is incident to the power of appointment, not to the power of
advising and consenting to appointment, and when the grant of the executive power is
enforced by the express mandate to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, it
emphasizes the necessity for including within the executive power as conferred the
exclusive power of removal.
Id. at 122. It is helpful to note for historical comparison that in The Federalist No. 77, Hamilton
recognized the constitutional inference of presidential removal power, but noted that "[tihe consent
of [the Senate] would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint." THE FEDERALIST No. 77,
supra note 2, at 515 (Alexander Hamilton).
71. See also Calabresi, supra note 2, at 33-34. Calabresi notes that the "enormous, mind-
boggling growth in federal governmental power" sparked by the New Deal drastically changed the
distribution of power between the President and Congress. Id. He suggests it is even difficult to tell
whether the executive power has increased or decreased due to the subtle ways in which the
President has lost or gained power through the administrative system. Id. As an additional note,
Calabresi concludes that because the system of incentives and accountability has remained stronger
in the Executive: "The net result . . . is an unmitigated redistributive disaster that no one would
defend if they thought about it and that as a practical matter can only be ameliorated by
strengthening presidential power. . . ." Id. at 34; see also infra Part IV.B.
72. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
73. PRESIDENTIAL POWER, supra note 7, at 287. Calabresi and Yoo note specifically that
"Roosevelt regarded his defeat in Humphrey 's Executor as a personal affront. Even more important,
it threatened his ability to coordinate the execution of the law." Id.
74. Id at 283.
75. FDR's administration represented the respondent in Humphrey's Executor and relied heavily
on the Myers decision in its brief and oral argument to support a hard-line view of the unitary
executive. Id. at 284.
76. The Court took the removal power upheld in Myers and limited it to purely executive
officers, finding that the "actual decision" in Myers merely relied on the theory that "such an officer
is merely one of the units in the executive department and, hence, inherently subject to the exclusive
and illimitable power of removal by the Chief Executive, whose subordinate and aid he is."
Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 627. The Court went on to hold that
the necessary reach of the [Myers] decision goes far enough to include all purely
executive officers. It goes no farther; much less does it include an officer who occupies
no place in the executive department and who exercises no part of the executive power
vested by the Constitution in the President.
Id. at 627-28. Contrasting Myers's support of removal power over the post-master general, the
Court noted that as the FTC enforced statutory prohibitions of "unfair methods of competition," it
acted as a quasi-legislative body. Id. at 628. When it acted as a master in chancery for the
adjudication of such claims, the FTC acted as a quasi-judicial body. Id The Court concluded that
"[t]o the extent that [the FTC] exercises any executive function-as distinguished from executive
power in the constitutional sense-it does so in the discharge and effectuation of its quasi-legislative
or quasi-judicial powers, or as an agency of the legislative or judicial departments of the
government." Id.
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upheld congressional restrictions on the President's removal power of
members of the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC").7  The Court's analysis
sprung from a candid understanding of new agency functions at the time of
the New Deal.78 The Court explained:
The Federal Trade Commission is an administrative body created by
Congress to carry into effect legislative policies embodied in the
statute in accordance with the legislative standard therein
prescribed, and to perform other specified duties as a legislative or
as a judicial aid. Such a body cannot in any proper sense be
77. Id at 629. The Court upheld fixed terms for members of the FTC and "for cause"
restrictions on their removal due to the informational and nonpartisan purposes of the FTC. Id. at
621-26. According to the decision of FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927), the FTC
functionally is
empowered to prevent the using of "unfair methods of competition" in interstate and
foreign commerce, and, if it finds that "any unfair method of competition" is being used,
to issue an order requiring the offender "to cease and desist from using such method of
competition." The [Federal Trade] Commission exercises only the administrative
functions delegated to it by the [Federal Trade Commission] Act ....
Id. at 623 (quoting Nat'l Harness Mfrs. Ass'n v. FTC, 268 F. 795, 707 (1920)).
78. One of the major constitutional contributions of the New Deal was that of congressional
delegation of legislative functions. See PATRICK M. GARRY, AN ENTRENCHED LEGACY: HOW THE
NEW DEAL CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION CONTINUES TO SHAPE THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME
COURT 20 (2008). As the "fourth branch" grew in size and power, Congress found it necessary to
leave many legislative functions to agencies, as Congress could no longer anticipate the legal
framework required for the agency's purpose. See id; see, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S.
742, 785 (1948) ("It is not necessary that Congress supply administrative officials with a specific
formula for their guidance in a field where flexibility and the adaptation of the congressional policy
to infinitely variable conditions constitute the essence of the program."). In a line of post-New Deal
cases, the Supreme Court swept aside the traditional constitutional construction of nondelegation
(barring delegation of legislative power) in favor of the "flexibility" afforded to agencies by
legislative delegation. GARRY, supra, at 20; see, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425-26
(1944). Since its decision in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935),
the Court has not overturned any federal legislation for violating the nondelegation doctrine.
GARRY, supra, at 22. The reasons for this may be twofold, as suggested by Prof. Michael Hertz:
First, well-known, and no doubt most important, is simply a straightforward assessment
of the merits; the current Justices, like their predecessors, have concluded that a
nondelegation doctrine with teeth would be unmanageable and unenforceable in a
consistent way. A second factor is likely also at work here. The Court's nondelegation
nondoctrine enhances the authority of agencies at the expense of Congress. The Court
seems not unhappy with such a shift. It insists-in a counterfactual effort to maintain
constitutional form, as under Chevron-that Congress has made a meaningful decision
and that the agency is not "legislating."
Michael Hertz, The Rehnquist Court and Administrative Law, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 297, 358 (2004).
For a discussion of the Court's aversion to nondelegation "with teeth," see id. at 358, n.300 (citing
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1988) (recognizing Congress "simply cannot do its job
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives")); Richard B. Stewart, The
Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1693-97 (1975) ("While the
courts might in some cases more carefully limit broad legislative delegations through statutory
construction, any large-scale enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine would clearly be unwise.
Detailed legislative specification of policies under contemporary conditions would be neither
feasible nor desirable in many cases, and the judges are ill-equipped to distinguish contrary cases.").
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characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive. Its duties are
performed without executive leave and, in the contemplation of the
statute, must be free from executive control."
The Humphrey's Executor decision drastically limited the President's
removal powers by confining Myers to purely executive agencies and purely
Executive Branch offices.80 Perhaps even more significantly, the Court
essentially created a class of independent agencies insulated from executive
control.8 '
The Court revisited presidential removal power and its decision in
Humphrey's Executor only once more before 1988.82 In the case of Wiener
v. United States, the Court upheld this functional distinction between purely
executive and quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agencies. 83  Wiener
compared President Eisenhower's removal power over the War Powers
Commission with President Roosevelt's power over the FTC.84 The Court
concluded that because, like the FTC, the War Powers Commission
functioned as a quasi-judicial agency,85 President Eisenhower had no power
to remove a member of the War Powers Commission without cause, even
though the governing statute did not explicitly impose limits on removal.86
79. Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 628.
80. The Court explained that the Myers case supports the principle that a purely executive officer
"is merely one of the units in the executive department and, hence, inherently subject to the
exclusive and illimitable power of removal by the Chief Executive." Id. at 627. However, the Court
also noted that "the necessary reach of the [Myers] decision goes far enough to include all purely
executive officers. It goes no farther . . . ." Id. at 627-28. See also PRESIDENTIAL POWER, supra
note 7, at 285.
81. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 353 (1958) ("Humphrey's case was a cause
cdlkbre-and not least in the halls of Congress. . . . It drew a sharp line of cleavage between
officials who were part of the Executive establishment and were thus removable by virtue of the
President's constitutional powers, and those who are members of a body 'to exercise its judgment
without the leave or hindrance of any other official or any department of the government,' as to
whom a power of removal exists only if Congress may fairly be said to have conferred it. This sharp
differentiation derives from the difference in functions between those who are part of the Executive
establishment and those whose tasks require absolute freedom from Executive interference."
(citations omitted)). The Court in Humphrey's Executor rejected Chief Justice Taft's dicta in Myers,
which suggested that the rationale supporting the President's removal powers might be extended to
include agencies with quasi-judicial functions. See Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 627-28 ("Putting
aside dicta, which may be followed if sufficiently persuasive but which are not controlling, the
necessary reach of the decision goes far enough to include all purely executive officers."); Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926); see also Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS
BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 62-63 (2007).
82. The Court's decision in Bowsher v. Synar resurrected a discussion of Humphrey's Executor
and Myers in 1986, but the case focused on whether Congress could vest executive functions in the
Comptroller General, an officer controlled solely by the Legislative Branch. See Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714 (1986). The next case addressing presidential removal power was Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654 (1988). Cf Dan Balhoff, Bowsher v. Synar: Separation of Powers, the Removal of
Officers, and the Administrative State, 47 LA. L. REv. 617, 626 (1987); FISHER, supra note 81, at 71.
83. Wiener, 357 U.S. at 353.
84. See id. at 354; see also infra note 86 and accompanying text.
85. Wiener, 357 U.S. at 356.
86. The Court noted with rhetorical flourish:
If, as one must take for granted, the War Claims Act precluded the President from
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The Court's holding severely clashed with President Eisenhower's emphasis
on unitary executive influence over independent agencies. Yet, citing
Humphrey's Executor, the Court made the plain statement that the
Constitution does not give the President the power to remove officers
without cause from an agency with quasi-judicial functions.
2. Removal Power Limitations for Purely Executive Officers
Thirty years later, the Court solidified its limits on presidential removal
power. In Morrison v. Olson, the Court addressed the issue of whether
Congress could constitutionally impose a "good cause" restriction on the
President's removal power over purely executive officers.89  The case
addressed Congress's construction of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978,
which authorized the Attorney General to appoint an "independent counsel"
empowered to investigate and prosecute high-ranking government
officials. 90 The Act imposed a restriction that allowed the President, through
the Attorney General, to remove the independent counsel only after a
showing of "good cause."9' The Court upheld the Act, most significantly
indicating that even officers conducting quintessentially executive activities
could be at least partially shielded from presidential removal power through
the vesting of removal power in an "alter ego" 92 like the Attorney General.
Like his predecessors, President Ronald Reagan and his administration
opposed the ruling and argued that such restrictions impeded the President's
ability to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . ."" As the
influencing the [FTC] in passing on a particular claim, afortiori must it be inferred that
Congress did not wish to have hang over the [FTC] the Damocles' sword of removal by
the President for no reason other than that he preferred to have . .. men of his own
choosing [within the FTC].
Id.; see also PRESIDENTIAL POWER, supra note 7, at 324. As noted in the quotation above, the Court
simply inferred Congress's intent to limit removal power from the quasi-judicial nature of the FTC.
87. See PRESIDENTIAL POWER, supra note 7, at 323-25. Much like FDR, Eisenhower used
multiple avenues of influence over independent agencies. Id. at 323. By assigning policy studies to
the commissions and notifying them of his legislative and budgetary priorities, Eisenhower tried to
incorporate independent agencies into the Executive Branch and change agency commissioners into
executive officers. Id.
88. See Wiener, 357 U.S. at 356.
89. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 659-61 (1988).
90. Id. at 660; see also FISHER, supra note 81, at 71.
91. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 663; see also id. at 686 n.23 (allowing an independent counsel to be
removed through impeachment and conviction or by the action of the Attomey General for "physical
disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition that substantially impairs the performance" of
the counsel's duties).
92. Id. at 688-92 ("[B]ecause the independent counsel may be terminated for 'good cause,' the
Executive, through the Attorney General, retains ample authority to assure that the counsel is
competently performing his or her statutory responsibilities in a manner that comports with the
provisions of the Act."); see also PRESIDENTIAL POWER, supra note 7, at 378.
93. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also PRESIDENTIAL POWER, supra note 7, at 377.
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Solicitor General's amicus brief reasoned, "[t]he independent counsel statute
violates the plain meaning of those words by taking an important part of the
executive power ... away from the President and assigning it to a person
unaccountable to the President. .. ."9 The Court's ruling in Morrison set
precedent against a unitary-executive interpretation of removal power.95 Yet,
despite limiting presidential removal, Morrison also carved out alternative
opportunities for executive power through the Appointments Clause, as will be
discussed below.96
B. Legislative and Executive Tension Over the Appointments Clause
Though the removal power is often a source of conflict between the
unitary Executive and Congress, the President's appointment power is just as
inflammatory.97  In key decisions regarding the appointment power, the
Supreme Court has focused on finding a test for which government employees
qualify as officers appointable by the President.9 8 In its modem decisions on
the Appointments Clause, the Court builds upon a century-old judicial
distinction between principal and inferior officers:
The Constitution for purposes of appointment very clearly divides all
its officers into two classes. The primary class requires a nomination
by the President and confirmation by the Senate. But foreseeing that
when offices became numerous, and sudden removals necessary, this
mode might be inconvenient, it was provided that, in regard to
officers inferior to those specially mentioned, Congress might by law
vest their appointment in the President alone, in the courts of law, or
in the heads of departments. 99
94. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654 (1988) (No. 87-1279), 1988 WL 1031600, at *5-6.
95. See PRESIDENTIAL POWER, supra note 7, at 378.
96. Though Morrison specifically addressed constitutional limits on the removal power, it also
discussed the foundational inquiry necessary for analysis of the Appointments Clause, a natural
segue considering that the former is simply the inverse of the latter. See generally Chad N.
Eckhardt, Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board: The Decision That
Corporate America May Forever Be Waiting For, 36 N. KY. L. REv. 143, 147-48 (2009).
97. See generally MICHAEL GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 81-180 (2000).
Gerhardt's work suggests that the friction triggered by the appointments power and tensions
triggered by the removal power are somewhat of a matched set. Id. Congress reins in a President's
calculated removal action by creating offices that are not purely executive. See supra Part IIA; infra
Part II.B. In the same way, Congress seeks to limit presidential appointment power by creating
officer positions that are not "principal" according to the terms of the Appointments Clause. See
GERHARDT, supra, at 153. "The Appointments Clause empowers Congress to create (and, by
implication, to eliminate) confirmable positions, and U.S. history is replete with examples of
congressional attempts to use this power to facilitate the [L]egislative [B]ranch's control over the
federal appointments process." Id.
98. GERHARDT, supra note 97, at 158-59; see also United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
385, 393 (1867) ("An office is a public station, or employment, conferred by the appointment of
government. The term embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties.").
99. United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509-10 (1878), relied upon by Buckley v. Valeo,
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1. Appointment Power Over Independent Agencies
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court clarified the distinction between classes
of officers and upheld the President's power over the appointment of
principal officers. 00 The case addressed the constitutionality of the Federal
Election Campaign Act, which among many other purposes gave Congress
the power to appoint four of the six members on the Federal Election
Commission ("FEC").101 The appellee-FEC argued that because Congress
holds special authority over the regulation of elections, the Appointments
Clause should also be read to give Congress appointment power over
officers in charge of regulating elections.102 The Court responded with a
strong defense of formalistic separation of powers, holding that it saw no
reason to believe that "the authority of Congress over federal election
practices is of such a wholly different nature from the other grants of
authority to Congress that it may be employed in such a manner as to offend
well-established constitutional restrictions stemming from the separation of
powers." 03 The Buckley Court softened the edges of its previous precedent
and offered more deference to the Executive by noting that "[t]he Court in
[Humphrey's Executor] carefully emphasized that although the members of
such agencies were to be independent of the Executive in their day-to-day
operations, the Executive was not excluded from selecting them."
Although the Court acknowledged that an agency of "an investigative and
informative nature" could be appointed by Congress, 105 the Necessary and
424 U.S. 1, 125-26 (1976).
100. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 143; see also GERHARDT, supra note 97, at 158. The Buckley Court
specifically sought to preserve separation of powers and the President's power of appointment.
101. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126-27 ("Although two members of the [FEC] are initially selected
by the President, his nominations are subject to confirmation not merely by the Senate, but by the
House of Representatives as well. The remaining four voting members of the [FEC] are appointed
by the President pro tempore of the Senate and by the Speaker of the House. While the second part
of the Clause authorizes Congress to vest the appointment of the officers described in that part in
'the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments,' neither the Speaker of the House nor the
President pro tempore of the Senate comes within this language.").
102. Id. at 131-32.
103. Id. at 132.
104. Id. at 133 (citing Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625-26). The relevant
portion of Humphrey's Executor points out:
The debates in both houses demonstrate that the prevailing view was that the commission
was not to be "subject to anybody in the government but ... only to the people of the
United States"; free from "political domination or control" or the "probability or
possibility of such a thing"; to be "separate and apart from any existing department of the
government-not subject to the orders of the President."
Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 625 (omission in original). In Humphrey's Executor, the Court
emphasized that the members of the Federal Trade Commission members were "called upon to
exercise the trained judgment of a body of experts 'appointed by law and informed by experience.'"
Id. at 624.
105. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 137.
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Proper Clause 06 did not extend so far as to allow Congress to appoint
officers of the United States performing an executive function.'0o Put
another way, the Buckley decision provided a much-needed bookend to
Humphrey's Executor. The Court particularly emphasized that although
Humphrey's Executor upheld restrictions on removal power, it did not stand
for the proposition that the President could not exercise his appointment
power over officers in such agencies, even if they were of a quasi-legislative
or quasi-judicial nature. 08
2. Definitions for Appointable "Principal Officers"
The Buckley decision set the stage for the next legal battles over how
executive officers should be appointed. The Court used its decisions in
Morrison and Edmond v. United States'09 to develop a clearer test"o for
appointments.1" Morrison declined to draw any bright line between inferior
or principal officers, yet it drew upon several key factors to determine that
the independent counsel at issue was in fact an inferior officer.112 In
Edmond, the Court explained the distinction: "[I]n the context of a Clause
designed to preserve political accountability[,] ... we think it evident that
'inferior officers' are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some
level by others who were appointed by presidential nomination with the
106. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (giving Congress the power "[t]o make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.").
107. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 134-35; see also GERHARDT, supra note 97, at 158.
108. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 133. Though more about congressional limits than presidential
power, Bowsher v. Synar also offers a supporting piece to the Buckley Court's framework. See
GERHARDT, supra note 97, at 159. In Bowsher, the Court struck down the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, which vested the comptroller general, an officer removable
only by Congress, with executive functions, including the implementation of policies for deficit
reduction. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). The Court pointed out, "[t]he Constitution
does not contemplate an active role for Congress in the supervision of officers charged with the
execution of the laws it enacts." Id. at 722 (citing later the decision of INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983), where the Court struck down a single-house "legislative veto" provision giving each house
of Congress the power to reverse a decision of the attorney general).
109. 520 U.S. 651 (1997).
110. The Court freely acknowledged that the Founders left very little guidance on where to draw
the line between inferior and principal officers. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 655, 671 (1988).
Perhaps this is why the Court in Morrison declined to draw the line at all. See id. at 671 ("We need
not attempt here to decide exactly where the line falls between the two types of officers . . . .").
Despite this declaration, the Morrison Court did in fact outline four factors to begin the inquiry: (1)
whether the officer can be removed by a superior executive officer; (2) the scope of the officer's
duties; (3) the scope of the officer's jurisdiction; and (4) any limitations on the officer's tenure. Id.
at 670-71.
111. See Eckhardt, supra note 96, at 146.
112. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 661. "[W]e [the Court] relied on several factors: that the independent
counsel was subject to removal by a higher officer (the Attorney General), that she performed only
limited duties, that her jurisdiction was narrow, and that her tenure was limited." Id. (citing
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671-72). In Edmond, the Court upheld the appointment of civilian Coast
Guard judges by the Secretary of Transportation because the judges were inferior officers by the
terms of the Appointments Clause. Id at 666.
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advice and consent of the Senate."' In many ways, this description is a
succinct summation of the factors discussed in Morrison.114  An officer's
supervisors, duties, jurisdiction, and tenure all roughly estimate whether he
or she is directed and supervised by a higher officer."' This connection
may explain why some courts still look to Morrison for guidance to answer
the Edmond test." 6  In the end, the Morrison/Edmond interpretation of
principal and inferior officers provides the modem foundation for the
President's appointment power over principal officers."'
The Edmond Court explained the implications of the Appointments
Clause for separation of powers: "By vesting the President with the
exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) officers of the United
States, the Appointments Clause prevents congressional encroachment upon
the Executive and Judicial Branches."' 18  Yet even with these inherent
protections, the tension between the Executive and Legislative Branches
over the administrative state has only become more complex since the
113. Id. at 663. The Edmond case is one of three cases since Morrison where the Court has taken
the opportunity to reject challenges to nonpresidential appointments. GERHARDT, supra note 97, at
160. Prior to Edmond, the Court decided the cases of Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868
(1991), and Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994). In Freytag, the Court held that the chief
judge of the Tax Court could appoint special tax judges under the Tax Reform Act of 1984. See
Freytag, 501 U.S. at 891-92. The Court reasoned that because the Tax Court was primarily a court
of law rather than an executive "department," it could hold limited appointment power while
providing appropriately constitutional diffusion of the power. Id. at 892. Despite its decision to
expand nonpresidential appointment powers, the Court also recognized,
[t]he Appointments Clause prevents Congress from distributing power too widely by
limiting the actors in whom Congress may vest the power to appoint. The Clause reflects
our Framers' conclusion that widely distributed appointment power subverts democratic
government. Given the inexorable presence of the administrative state, a holding that
every organ in the Executive Branch is a department would multiply indefinitely the
number of actors eligible to appoint.
Id. at 885. In Weiss, the Court upheld the appointment power of the judge attorney general for the
selection of military judges for special and general court-martial. Weiss, 510 U.S. at 175-76.
Relying on the status of the military judges as presidentially appointed, commissioned officers, the
Court noted,
while Congress may create an office, it cannot appoint the officer; . . . the officer can
only be appointed by the [P]resident with the approval of the [S]enate. . . . [O]fficers of
the United States who had been theretofore appointed by the [P]resident and confirmed
by the [S]enate, we do not think that, because additional duties, germane to the offices
already held by them, were devolved upon them by the act, it was necessary that they
should be again appointed by the [Plresident and confirmed by the [S]enate ....
Weiss, 510 U.S. at 173-74 (quoting Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 300-01 (1893)).
114. See Helisek, supra note 60, at 1069.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Stanley v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 653, 659 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Generally, if an officer is
limited in 'tenure, duration, [and] . . . duties,' those findings lead to the conclusion that she is an
inferior officer. . . . It is well established that Congress may vest the appointment of inferior officers
in the Department of Justice.").
117. See Helisek, supra note 60, at 1069.
118. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 659.
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development of the Court's precedent on the issue." 9 Perhaps this is why,
notwithstanding the popular accountability of the Executive' 20 and the
direction of the Court, Congress has continued to create complex schemes to
avoid entanglement with the Appointments Clause. After years of silence on
the issue,121 the Court has now ruled upon, without directly answering, Free
Enterprise's question regarding the "next generation" 22 of Congress's
conflict with presidential appointment and removal powers.123
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW: FREE ENTERPRISE AND THE PCAOB
The precedent and philosophy supporting the Appointments Clause
suggest why the current state of the law for the PCAOB has now become so
pivotal.124 Judge Kavanaugh of the D.C. Circuit described Free Enterprise
as the most important case on the President's appointment and removal
powers to occur in the past twenty years.125  This "case of first
impression" 26 brings the unitary Executive into conflict with the will of
Congress in an unprecedented fashion.127  Because the PCAOB is an
independent agency under the control of another independent agency, its
structure cannot coexist with the unitary executive perspective.128 It is the
first agency to be completely and permanently exempt from executive
oversight.129 In order to understand the true impact of the case, however, it
is first necessary to examine the roots of the PCAOB.
119. See PRESIDENTIAL POWER, supra note 7, at 424-31.
120. See generally Calabresi, supra note 2, at 58-60.
121. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 685 (D.C. Cir.
2008), affd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
122. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 24, at 8 ("In creating the Board, Congress
deliberately sought to test the outer boundaries of its ability to reduce Presidential power, by
establishing a .'Fifth Branch" of the Federal Government' (Pet. App. 72a) over which the President
has markedly less control than he exercises over traditional 'Fourth Branch' independent agencies
like the SEC, which 'up to now have [reflected] the outermost constitutional limits of permissible
congressional restrictions' on the President (Pet App. 67a)."); see also supra note 62 and
accompanying text.
123. See Free Enter. Fund, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009), afd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 130
S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
124. See infra Part III.
125. See Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 685 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct.
2378.
126. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 24, at 7 (citation omitted).
127. Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Powers, Independent Agencies, and Financial Regulation:
The Case ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 485, 486-87 (2009). Pildes proposes that
"the challengers to the [Sarbanes-Oxley] Act present this constitutional struggle as the latest
battlefront over the 'unitary executive branch' theory of the Constitution." Id. at 486.
128. Unlike the temporary independent counsel law upheld in Morrison or the nonpresidential
judicial appointments upheld in Edmond and Freytag, the PCAOB is permanently insulated from the
Executive Branch because its members are removable only by an independent agency whose
members are removable only for good cause. This characteristic does not change even in light of the
Supreme Court's ruling. See infra Part IV.
129. See Pildes, supra note 127, at 487-88; c.f 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006).
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A. Purpose and Structure of the PCAOB
The "sweeping reform"l30 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act established the
PCAOB for the purpose of confronting the embarrassing auditing scandals
of the late 1990s and early 2000s.' 3 1 Congress intended the Board to protect
the interests of investors and the public by ensuring accurate and
independent auditing of public companies.132  To carry out this purpose,
Congress designed the Board to police independently the auditors of public
companies.'33 The PCAOB possesses a broad array of enforcement powers,
including the ability to create auditing standards,134 enforce compliance with
such standards,'13  conduct investigations into accounting company
compliance,136 hold disciplinary proceedings,' 37 and impose sanctions for
violations. 138
Notably, Congress gave this new Board a function traditionally left to a
confederation of private organizations facilitating the auditing companies'
self-regulation.139 Congress intended the Board to be "independent" above
and beyond the industry's self-regulation,140 but it created the Board to
130. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
131. Pildes, supra note 129, at 486. For an in-depth discussion of the "Big Four" scandals (Enron,
Global Crossing, Qwest, and World Com), see Cunningham, supra note 12, at 928-37. It is
interesting to note that of these four incidents, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act mentions two by name in its
section requiring a General Accounting Office study of investment banks. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 705(a), 116 Stat. 745 (2002). Such a mention highlights the focus of
the act and illustrates Congress's intent to confront the public chagrin over financial dishonesty.
132. 15 U.S.C.S. § 7211 (LexisNexis 2006).
133. Id.; see also MICHAEL V. SEITZINGER & ELIZABETH BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL
31879, SECURITIES LAW: SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 AND SELECTED 108TH CONGRESS BILLS
CONCERNING CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 1 (2003), http://digital.library.unt.edulark:/67531/
metacrs4660/ml//high resd/.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(1).
135. Id. § 7214(a).
136. Id. § 7215(b)(1).
137. Id. § 7215(c)(4).
138. Id.; see also US. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial
Professionals: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Governmental Affairs, U.S. S., 108th
Cong. 350 (2003) [hereinafter Hearings] (prepared statement of William J. McDonough, Chairman
of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board).
139. See Pildes, supra note 127, at 486. See also Michael A. Carvin et al., Massive, Unchecked
Power by Design: The Unconstitutional Exercise of Executive Authority by the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 199, 202 (2007). The shortcomings of the self-
regulation system for auditors provided a unifying theme for Congress's consideration of the new
PCAOB. A parade of testifying witnesses noted that the confusing network of auditor oversight
organizations created a "positively Byzantine structure of accounting disciplinary bodies which
generally lack adequate and assured financial support, clear and undivided responsibility for
discipline, and an effective system of SEC oversight." Accounting Reform and Investor Protection
Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public Companies: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 532 (2002) (testimony of Joel Seligman, Dean and
Ethan A.H. Shepley Univ. Professor, Washington Univ. Sch. of Law).
140. See Nagy, supra note 18, at 1003-04. Prior to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
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mirror the structure of a corporation, rather than a government agency.141
As a technically private creation, the Board's rules are subject to SEC
approval as products of a "registered securities association."l 4 2 The budget
of the PCAOB is approved by the SEC,143 but its funding relies solely on the
fees the Board excises from public companies and other issuers of
securities.'4
Set permanently in this quasi-private, quasi-public purgatory, the Board
represents what Senator Phil Gramm described as "a strange kind of entity
[in that we] want it to be private, but we want it to have governmental
powers." 45  Testimony on the legislative history of Sarbanes-Oxley reveals
the prevailing interest .46 in the Board's unorthodox structure: "Without
Congress also considered at least four different alternative mechanisms for enforcement of new
standards for accounting firms conducting public company audits. See id at 1001-03. Nagy notes:
Four proposals are particularly important to an understanding of the PCAOB. The first
was a bill (H.R. 3763) sponsored by Representative Michael Oxley (R-Ohio) . .. [and]
titled "The Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency
Act" (CAARTA)[, which] . . . required the SEC to establish criteria for "public regulation
organizations," but the bill itself did not actually create such an entity. CAARTA's
critics favored an alternative bill (H.R. 3818) sponsored by Representative John LaFalce
(D-N.Y.), that required the SEC to establish a "Public Accounting Regulatory Board."
The third proposal took the form of a draft bill disseminated by Senator Michael Enzi (R-
Wyo.), with input from Senator Phil Gramm (R-Tex.), that required the SEC to establish
a "Professional Standards Board." The last of these proposals was a bill (S. 2004) co-
sponsored by Senators Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.) and Jon Corzine (D-N.J.) requiring
the SEC to create an "Independent Public Accounting Board."
Id at 1001. Nagy goes on to explain that a comparison of these proposals to the eventual structure
of the PCAOB shows a distinct lack of partisan push for the Board to be in the public or private
sector. Id. Rather, Congress essentially decided to have its cake and eat it too by creating a quasi-
private entity holding powers delegated by the federal government. See 148 Cong. Rec. S6337
(daily ed. July 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Phil Gramm) (describing the PCAOB as "a strange kind
of entity [in that we] want it to be private, but we want it to have governmental powers"); see also
supra note 23 and accompanying text.
141. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 7211 (LexisNexis 2006); see also SEITZINGER & BAZAN, supra note 133,
at 1-2.
142. SEITZINGER & BAZAN, supra note 133, at 4. The SEC emerged in the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 during the country's recovery after the Great Depression. See generally Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78d. As the statutory parent of the PCAOB, the SEC is an
independent agency entrusted with the administration of securities and finance laws. See, e.g., S.
Rep. No. 110-417, at 107 (2009). The mission of the agency is "to administer and enforce Federal
securities laws in order to protect investors, maintain fair, honest, and efficient markets, and promote
capital formation. This includes ensuring full disclosure of financial information, regulating the
Nation's securities markets, and preventing and policing fraud and malpractice in the securities and
financial markets." Id.
143. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 7211; see also Hearings, supra note 138, at 351 (prepared statement of
William J. McDonough) ("The Securities and Exchange Commission ... approved [the budget of
$68 million for the Board's first fiscal year] . . . and we [the Board] have sent invoices to public
companies and other issuers of securities-based on their relative equity market capitalizations, in
accordance with the Act-to fund it.").
144. 15 U.S.C. § 7219(b)-(d); see also Hearings, supra note 138, at 351 (prepared statement of
William J. McDonough).
145. 148 CONG. REC. S6337 (daily ed. July 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Phil Gramm). For a
summary of Sen. Gramm's connection to the PCAOB, see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
146. See Carvin et al., supra note 139, at 203-04 (citing 148 CONG. REC. S6331 (daily ed. July 8,
2002) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes) ("I believe, frankly, that we need to establish this oversight board
in statute in order to provide an extra guarantee of its independence and its plenary authority to deal
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independence and neutrality, standards setters cannot effectively withstand
the myriad of constituent pressures that it inevitably will face to make the
tough decisions that it inevitably will need to make."1 4 7  The PCAOB
replaces the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants with a five-
member board, appointed and supervised by the SEC. 148 A majority of the
five members must be non-CPAs, and the chairman must have abstained
from practicing public accounting for at least five years before joining the
Board.149  Each member serves for a five-year term with a two-term limit
and, before the Supreme Court decision,so no member could be removed by
the SEC except "for good cause,"' 51  defined as: "willful violations of the
[Sarbanes-Oxley] Act, Board rules, or the securities laws; willful abuse of
authority; or unreasonable failure to enforce compliance-as determined in a
,,152formal Commission order ....
Although the Board's structure is unique, its purpose is not. 5 1 Since the
1930s, the SEC has overseen regulation of the securities market by a wide
variety of public, private, and quasi-private organizations.1 54 These entities
collaborated under the plenary supervision of the SEC to regulate capital
markets.' 55 The Board's design thus reflects Congress's attempt to echo the
industry's system of regulation while answering the public scandals with the
weight of government leadership.5 6
with this important situation.")).
147. Accounting Reform and Investor Protection: Hearings on the Legislative History of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron
and Other Public Companies Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 107th
Cong. 44 (2002) (testimony of Michael Sutton, Chief Accountant of the Securities and Exchange
Commission from 1995 to 1998); see also id. (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Former SEC Chairman)
(offering an example of such "extraordinary . .. political pressure" previously pushed on the SEC in
its attempts to limit auditor ability to double as public company consultant).
148. Cunningham supra note 12, at 943.
149. Id. at 944.
150. See infra Parts III.B, IV.
151. Cunningham, supra note 12, at 943 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006)). Note that SEC
members themselves are appointed for fixed terms removable only for cause. See 15 U.S.C. §
78d(a); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3148 (2010)
(quoting Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935)) ("The parties agree that the
[SEC] Commissioners cannot themselves be removed by the President except under the Humphrey's
Executor standard of 'inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. . .
152. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3158 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7217(d)(3)).
153. See Pildes, supra note 127, at 486.
154. These entities included the New York Stock Exchange, the Chicago Board of Options
Exchange, and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (replacing the National Association of
Securities Dealers). Pildes, supra note 127, at 489.
155. Id.
156. Id. Specifically, the Board essentially replaces the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, "the industry body having since 1939 defined Generally Accepted Auditing
Standards." Cunningham, supra note 12, at 919.
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B. Constitutional Analysis of the PCAOB: The Free Enterprise Case
Congress set up the PCAOB to have "unchecked power"' in a way that
would ensure its full autonomy and, by extension, its ability to create,
adjudicate, and enforce auditing standards without industry or constituent
pressures.' 5 ' Despite this laudable aim, Free Enterprise reveals the devil in
the Board's legislative details.'59  As noted earlier, though the Board's
enacting legislation expressly classifies it as a non-governmental, nonprofit
corporation,160 Supreme Court precedent establishes that the Board is a
government agency for purposes of constitutional analysis.16 ' This
classification provides the foundation for the constitutional questions
brought by Free Enterprise.162  Given the high volume of work already
published on the case,16 3 it is perhaps more helpful now to discuss briefly the
decision of the D.C. Circuit,'" then to turn to the decision of the Supreme
Court, and finally to conduct an analysis of the Board framed by
constitutional and policy interests represented in the amicus curiae6 s briefs
157. 148 CONG. REC. S6334 (daily ed. July 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Phil Gramm). For a
summary of Sen. Gramm's connection to the PCAOB, see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 107-205, at 2 (2002).
159. This point is illustrated vividly, of course, by the Free Enterprise case itself.
160. See 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006); supra note 18 and accompanying text.
161. See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger, 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995); supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
162. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., No. 06-0217, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24310, at *10-11 (D.D.C. 2007), affd, 537 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), affd in part, revd in
part, and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) ("The parties agree that, at least for purposes of these
motions, PCAOB should be considered a governmental entity, and so it shall be.").
163. See, e.g., Carvin et al, supra note 139; Eckhardt, supra note 96; Harvard Law Review
Association, D.C. Circuit Holds that the SEC Chairman Is Not the "Head" of the SEC, 122 HARV.
L. REv. 2267 (2009) (arguing the D.C. Circuit decision was decided incorrectly and that the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act did in fact violate separation of powers and the Appointments Clause); Helisek,
supra note 60; Michael R. Keefe, The Constitutionality of the Double For-Cause Removal
Restriction, 77 U. CIN. L. REv. 1653 (2009) (analyzing the D.C. Circuit decision and possible
congressional responses); Nagy, supra note 18.
164. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd, 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008),
affd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
165. See Brief for Amici Curiae Former Chairmen of the Securities and Exchange Commission in
Support of Respondents, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138
(2010) (No. 08-861), 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1081 (describing the SEC's plenary power over
the PCAOB); Brief for the Center for Audit Quality as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board, Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (No. 08-861), 2009 U.S.
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1083 (addressing the role of the PCAOB in accomplishing Congress's goals for
public company auditing); Brief of National Association of State Boards of Accountancy as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondents, Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (No. 08-861), 2009 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 1084 (arguing the PCAOB is constitutional and the Court should exercise judicial
restraint in its decision due to the important work of the Board); Brief for Constitutional and
Administrative Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct.
3138 (No. 08-861), 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1085 (arguing a ruling for the petitioners would
overturn precedent and disrupt government functions); Brief of the Council of Institutional Investors
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (No. 08-861),
2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1082 (emphasizing the important role of the PCAOB and urging the
Court to preserve the Board even if necessary to strike constitutionally offending aspects of it); Brief
of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (No.
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filed with the Court. These interests frame the underlying issues of the
PCAOB and echo the fundamental question: who will ultimately be
responsible if it fails?'"6
1. Removal Power Arguments
The D.C. Circuit ruled two-to-one that the PCAOB did not violate the
Appointments Clause or the doctrine of separation of powers.16' The
majority addressed the question of whether the PCAOB violated separation
of powers by insulating its members from presidential removal.'16  The court
discussed a very brief history of Supreme Court precedent on the issue of
08-861), 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 661 (arguing the holding in Morrison should be overturned
and the Board should be held to violate the Appointments Clause); Brief of Amici Curiae Law
Professors in Support of Petitioners, Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (No. 08-861), 2009 U.S. S.
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 677 (arguing the PCAOB is not under the oversight of the SEC and its members
are principal officers who should be appointed by the President); Brief Amici Curiae of William P.
Barr et al. in Support of Petitioners, Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (No. 08-861), 2009 U.S. S.
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 678 (arguing the structure of the Board unconstitutionally strips the President of
his removal powers and contradicts original intent and Supreme Court precedent); Brief of Amici
Curiae American Civil Rights Union & Mallory Factor in Support of Petitioners, Free Enter. Fund,
130 S. Ct. 3138 (No. 08-861), 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 679 (emphasizing that the Board's
double insulation from presidential control controverts the public interest in preserving separation of
powers); Brief of Amicus Curiae The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence in
Support of Petitioners, Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (No. 08-861), 2009 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 680 (arguing the Board violates separation of powers and cannot be justified by
"convenience and complicity" between Congress and the President); Amicus Curiae Brief on the
Merits of Mountain States Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioners, Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct.
3138 (No. 08-861), 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 682 (arguing the Court should overturn its
precedent that conflicts with the text and original intent of the Appointments Clause and thus rule
independent agencies unconstitutional); Brief for the Cato Institute et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioners, Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (No. 08-861), 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 683
(underscoring the policy failures of the Board and dangerous policy implications of its structure);
Amicus Brief of the Center for Individual Rights in Support of Petitioners, Free Enter. Fund, 130 S.
Ct. 3138 (No. 08-861), 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 676 (arguing that the petitioners properly
passed over use of the administrative review scheme offered by the Board in order to present a
constitutional challenge); Brief for the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (No. 08-861), 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 681 (using the Free Enterprise case as a springboard to argue that NAFTA bi-national panels
violate the Appointments Clause).
166. See discussion supra Part 1.
167. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 672, 685. The court affirmed summary judgment granted at
the trial in favor of the PCAOB. Id. at 685. In the Supreme Court's hearing of Free Enterprise, it is
probably not surprising to note that the circuit court's majority opinion parallels the arguments
presented by the respondent at the next level. See id. at 671-74; Brief for Respondents, supra note
14. In the same way, Judge Kavanaugh's dissent in the circuit decision outlines the same general
arguments put forth by the petitioner in the Supreme Court appeal. See Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d
at 685-715 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); Brief for Petitioners, Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. 3138
(2010) (No. 08-861), 2009 WL 2247130.
168. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 679. For the specific statutory provision the court addressed,
see 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (e)(6) (2006) ("A member of the Board may be removed by the Commission
from office, in accordance with section 7217(d)(3) of this title, for good cause shown. . . .").
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removal power and asserted that "[t]he Supreme Court has long recognized
that some types of restrictions on Presidential authority within the Executive
Branch are permissible, especially in the case of independent agencies."l 69
Analogizing the President's limited removal powers in Humphrey's
Executor and Morrison, the majority noted that the SEC possesses both
appointment and removal powers over the Board. 7 o They concluded:
"Given the constitutionality of independent agencies and the Commission's
comprehensive control over the Board, the Fund cannot show that the
statutory scheme so restricts the President's control over the Board as to
violate separation of powers."17
Judge Kavanaugh responded to the majority's argument with the black-
and-white comparison between the PCAOB and the agencies upheld in
Humphrey's Executor and Morrison:
The removal issue in this case arises because, unlike in Humphrey's
Executor and Morrison, neither the President nor a Presidential alter
ego can remove the members of the PCAOB. Rather, the Board is
removable only by the Securities and Exchange Commission, and
only for cause. Put another way, the PCAOB is an independent
agency appointed by and removable for cause by another
independent agency.172
He argued that rather than merely limiting the President's ability to
remove officers, the Board's structure "completely strip[s]"' 73  the
President's power to execute the laws through control of his officers.17 4
Kavanaugh began by tracing the history of separation of powers from the
founding, arguing solidly for a unitary executive interpretation of executive
powers. 17' He made the same arguments as many scholars, 176 notably that
Article II vests executive power in a single person in order to focus
accountability and ensure energetic execution.177  Judge Kavanaugh
169. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 679.
170. Id at 679-80.
171. Id.at685.
172. Id. at 697 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). In this quotation, Judge Kavanaugh is referring to the
"alter ego" principle supported in Myers and Morrison. See id at 686 n. I (citing Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 133 (1926); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988)). The Supreme Court
uses "alter ego" to describe an executive officer that serves at the pleasure of the President and is
removable at will by the President. Id.
173. Id. Here, Judge Kavanaugh is referring to the Supreme Court's explanation of their holding
in Morrison: "[The Independent Counsel] is not a case in which the power to remove an executive
official has been completely stripped from the President, thus providing no means for the President
to ensure the 'faithful execution' of the laws." Id. at 698.
174. Id.
175. See id at 688-92; see also supra Parts 1, II.
176. See generally Calabresi, supra note 2; Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV.
L. REv. 2245 (2001).
177. See Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 689 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997)); see also Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405 (D.C. Cir.
1981); THE FEDERALIST NOS. 69, 70, 72, 76 (Alexander Hamilton); Kagan, supra note 176, at 2332
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combined this view of the presidency with his understanding of Morrison
and Humphrey 's Executor-namely that these cases represent the outer
limits of infringement on executive power and should not be exceeded.178
In the end, Judge Kavanaugh presented a textbook argument for a
formalistic interpretation of separation of powers. 79 Not only did he
dissent to the holding, he dissented to the majority's functional
interpretation of separation of powers. 180
The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit Court on the issue of
removal powers.' 8  The rhetoric employed by the Court seems to
indicate that it fully supports a broad view of executive power. 182 For
example, the Chief Justice cited The Federalist and Supreme Court
precedent for the proposition that
[w]ithout the ability to oversee the Board, or to attribute the
Board's failings to those whom he can oversee, the President is
no longer the judge of the Board's conduct.
The diffusion of power carries with it a diffusion of
accountability. . . .
By granting the Board executive power without the
Executive's oversight, this Act subverts the President's ability to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed-as well as the
public's ability to pass judgment on his efforts. 183
The Court limited its holding, however, to say only that the "dual
for-cause" limitations on the Board members' removal violated the
President's removal power.184 Following this conclusion, the Court held
that the Board itself was constitutional apart from its "for cause" removal
aspects." As discussed infra in Part IV, this holding does not
("The Presidency's unitary power structure, its visibility, and its 'personality' all render the office
peculiarly apt to exercise power in ways that the public can identify and evaluate.").
178. See Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 697-98 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
179. See Helisek, supra note 60, at 1078.
180. See id; Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 689 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
181. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3150 (2010).
182. See Kevin Russell, Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley Unconstitutionally Interferes with
Presidential Authority, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2010, 10:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2010/06/provision-of-sarbanes-oxley-unconstitutionally-interferes-with-presidential-authority/; see
also Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 47 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S.
Ct. 3138) ("Rather than accepting concessions, the Supreme Court on occasion has found that the
law (either constitutional or statutory) is more favorable to the Executive than the Executive itself
asserted in litigating the particular case.").




effectively protect the separation of powers described in the Court's lofty
rhetoric.
2. Appointment Power Arguments
The D.C. Circuit also addressed the Board's relationship with the
Appointments Clause.186  Relying on the rules from Edmond and
Morrison,'17 the court first examined whether the members of the Board
served as inferior or principal officers.188 The court then reasoned that SEC
members act as superiors to the PCAOB because they possess the power to
review nearly all of the Board's decisions.1 89 Despite the significant powers
vested in the PCAOB, the majority opinion explained, "[T]he fact that the
Board is charged with exercising extensive authority on behalf of the United
States does not mean that Board members must be appointed by the
President, for principal as well as inferior officers, by definition, 'exercis[e]
significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States."' 90 Instead
of emphasizing the broad powers of the Board, the court focused on the fact
that the Board possesses no technical power to "render a final decision on
behalf of the United States" without the permission of other executive
officers.'91 The court also stated that the for-cause restriction on the SEC's
186. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 671 (D.C. Cir.
2008), affd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). The court noted that the
Appointments Clause contemplates congressional delegation of appointment powers to entities other
than the President. Id. at 672. The petitioners (Free Enterprise Fund) argued that because the SEC
only reviews the Board's decisions and not its day-to-day operations and because the SEC is limited
to "for cause" removal of Board members, the members are not inferior officers for purposes of the
Appointments Clause. Id. The petitioners argued in the alternative that even if the Board members
could be considered inferior officers, the SEC does not constitute a "department" in which removal
powers may be vested. Id.
187. The court quoted Edmond: "Generally speaking, the term 'inferior officer' connotes a
relationship with some higher ranking officer or officers below the President: Whether one is an
'inferior' officer depends on whether he has a superior." Id (quoting Edmond v. United States, 520
U.S. 651, 662 (1997)).
188. Id.
189. The court gave examples of the SEC's control over the Board:
[T]he Commission approves all Board rules and may abrogate, delete, or add to them.
All Board sanctions are subject to plenary review by the Commission, and the
Commission "may enhance, modify, cancel, reduce, or require the remission of a sanction
imposed by the Board." As such, the Board's disciplinary authority "ultimately belongs
to the [Commission], and the legal views of the [Board] must yield to the Commission's
view of the law." The Commission both appoints and removes Board members. It also
may impose limitations upon Board activities and relieve the Board of its enforcement
authority altogether.
Id (third and fourth alterations in original) (citations omitted). The court compared these aspects of
oversight and found that the oversight exceeded the level of oversight over the coast guard judges in
Edmond and the independent counsel in Morrison. Id. at 672-73.
190. Id at 672 (quoting Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976))).
191. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 665, quoted in Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 672. In its analysis of the
Board's literal powers, the court cited the Supreme Court decision Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 673. The Supreme
Court held in Chevron that in the event of statutory ambiguity, courts must accept the interpretation
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power of removal1 92  did not indicate Board members are principal
officers.193  Affirming the SEC's oversight of the Board's decisions, the
court held that the Board's structure does not violate the Appointments
Clause because its members serve as inferior officers under the oversight of
the SEC. 194
Judge Kavanaugh's dissent of this point began with his assertion that the
"key initial question" is whether the officers of the Board are subject to for-
cause removal.' 9 He argued that Edmond was a "relatively easy case" to
determine the officers were inferior because they were subject to at-will
removal, which "has always been considered a powerful tool for control." 96
Judge Kavanaugh contrasted this status with that of an officer removable
only for cause, who is "ordinarily designed and understood to be free from
significant substantive direction and supervision by superiors."' 97  He
concluded that under the Edmond test, the members of the PCAOB are
principal officers because they are not subject to at-will removal or other
substantive control by the SEC.'98
of an executive agency so long as it is a reasonable interpretation. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45,
865. In Free Enterprise, the D.C. Circuit noted that the Board does not hold substantial, "Chevron-
like" interpretation powers. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 673. Instead, the majority argues that the
Sarbanes-Oxley provision gives the SEC wide latitude to review and regulate the decisions of the
Board. Id.
192. See 15 U.S.C. § 7217(d)(3) (2006). The language of the statute limits removal power as
follows:
The Commission may . . . remove from office . . . any member of the Board, if the
Commission finds ... that such member-
(A) has willfully violated any provision of this Act, the rules of the Board, or the
securities laws;
(B) has willfully abused the authority of that member; or
(C) without reasonable justification or excuse, has failed to enforce compliance
with any such provision or rule, or any professional standard by any registered public
accounting firm or any associated person thereof.
Id. (quoted in Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 674 n.5).
193. The petitioners argued that the for-cause limitation on the SEC's power to remove the
Board's members indicates the members are in fact principal officers. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at
673-74. The court responded by pointing out that removal limitations are only one factor of the
Edmond test for inferior officers. See Edmond, 520 U.S. at 666. The court quoted the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886), which stated that "[tihe
constitutional authority in Congress to thus vest the appointment implies authority to limit, restrict,
and regulate the removal by such laws as Congress may enact in relation to the officers so
appointed." Id. at 485.
194. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 674. The majority comes to this conclusion based on its
determination that the SEC is a "department" and thus constitutionally allowed to appoint inferior
officers. See id.
195. Id at 707 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
196. Id (citing Edmond, 520 U.S. at 664).
197. Id. (citing Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625-26 (1935)).
198. Id. at 711. In addition to the test for at-will removal, Judge Kavanaugh also attacked the
majority's premise of SEC control over the functions of the Board. In summing up his argument, he
asks:
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The Supreme Court affirmed the D.C. Circuit's decision regarding the
Appointments Clause.' 99  It reconciled Judge Kavanaugh's dissent by
resolving the separation-of-powers issue first.2 00  The Court held that the
Board members are inferior officers under Edmond because, as the Board
members will be removable at-will after the Court's decision, the SEC will
now be able to remove them whenever necessary and exercise sufficient
oversight over the Board's decisions. 20' Essentially, by eliminating the
Board members' removability for cause, the Court could then turn the Board
members into inferior officers appointable by the SEC.202
The D.C. Circuit Court's decision placed a constitutional question
before the Supreme Court untouched in earlier precedent.20 The Circuit
Court's majority opinion advocated a functional interpretation of separation
of powers that allows an independent agency to cross over into executive
How can we say that the Board is directed and supervised by the SEC given that the
Board has plenary statutory authority to conduct its most critical functions-inspections,
investigations, and enforcement actions-without any opportunity for the SEC to prevent
and affirmatively command, and to manage the ongoing conduct of, those activities?
What are the purpose and effect of the stringent statutory for-cause removal provision if
the Board is simply a subordinate of the SEC subject to the SEC's "comprehensive and
pervasive" control? And why should we accept the Board's characterization of itself as
part of the SEC when, as both statutory text and history reveal, Congress specifically
considered-and rejected-proposals to make the Board part of the SEC and Congress
expressly decided to create the Board as an independent entity?
Id. at 712.
199. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3163 (2010).
200. Id at 3162.
201. Id
202. Id Chief Justice Roberts explained,
[g]iven that the Commission is properly viewed, under the Constitution, as possessing the
power to remove Board members at will, and given the Commission's other oversight
authority [such as veto power over PCAOB rules and investigations], we have no
hesitation in concluding that under Edmond the Board members are inferior officers
whose appointment Congress may permissibly vest in a "Hea[d] of Departmen[t]."
Id. (second and third alterations in original). The Court clarified that "[b]ecause the Commission is a
freestanding component of the Executive Branch, not subordinate to or contained within any other
such component, it constitutes a 'Departmen[t]' for the purposes of the Appointments Clause." Id. at
6163 (second alteration in original).
203. See Helisek, supra note 60, at 1078-79; Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3153.
204. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3147; cf, e.g., Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 890
(1991) ("[W]e now examine the Tax Court's functions to define its constitutional status and its role
in the constitutional scheme."); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) ("But the real question
is whether the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President's ability to
perform his constitutional duty, and the functions of the officials in question must be analyzed in that
light."); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935) ("To the extent that [the FTC]
exercises any executive function-as distinguished from executive power in the constitutional
sense-it does so in the discharge and effectuation of its quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial
powers .... ); cf Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It seems to me, therefore, that
the decision of the Court of Appeals invalidating the present statute must be upheld on fundamental
separation-of-powers principles if the following two questions are answered affirmatively: (1) Is the
conduct of a criminal prosecution (and of an investigation to decide whether to prosecute) the
exercise of purely executive power? (2) Does the statute deprive the President of the United States
of exclusive control over the exercise of that power?").
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functions without executive control through appointment or removal.205
However, as Judge Kavanaugh points out, functional analysis may not
206Jugjustify the Board's complete insulation from presidential power. Judge
Kavanaugh argued that because the President holds exclusively executive
power, agencies exercising executive power should fall under presidential
control.207 Unlike previous cases, the PCAOB does not merely inhibit the
President's ability to appoint or remove officers of the agency. Instead, he
argued it establishes a class of agencies without political headship.20 8
Theoretically, the outcome of Free Enterprise could have determined
the legitimacy of such a class and whether the unitary Executive could still
inform agency development.209 Instead, the Supreme Court avoided the
question. Its analysis of the Board extends only to whether or not a sub-
agency's members can be removable "for cause" if its head agency's
members are also removable "for cause." 210  As discussed below, such a
decision does little to guide the shape of independent agencies to come.
IV. RECONCILING THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE WITH CONGRESSIONAL
INTENTIONS FOR THE PCAOB
Free Enterprise provides a window into the constitutionality and
practicality of independent agencies. The PCAOB challenges the outer
limits of separation of powers.211 It also challenges the ability of the
administrative state to replace an industry's self-regulation.2 12
The constitutional theories of the parties fell along predictable lines. 2 13
Petitioner Free Enterprise Fund argued for formulistic separation of powers,
arguing that "Congress thus violates separation of powers when it
205. See Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 674; see also Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3156
(discussing the dissent's functional approach, which mirrors the approach of the majority in the D.C.
Circuit).
206. See Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 707 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See Pildes, supra note 127, at 486-87. The unitary executive philosophy relies in part
executive control of agencies that perform executive functions. See supra Parts I, II. If the Court
endorses the double for-cause insulation of the Board, it will become the first independent agency to
be completely free from presidential control. See Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 698 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting); Morrison, 487 U.S. at 692. Such a ruling would indelibly strike part of the President's
power to execute the law through the federal bureaucracy. See Helisek, supra note 60, at 1079.
210. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3153-54 ("Without a layer of insulation between the
Commission and the Board, the Commission could remove a Board member at any time, and
therefore would be fully responsible for what the Board does. The President could then hold the
Commission to account for its supervision of the Board, to the same extent that he may hold the
Commission to account for everything else it does.").
211. Pildes, supra note 127, at 486-87.
212. See Cunningham, supra note 12, at 943.
213. See infra notes 214, 239 and accompanying text.
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undermines the authority and independence of the President by reassigning
or splintering his executive power. Such splintering increases Congress'[s]
power ... and obliterates public accountability... ."214 Contrarily, the
respondent PCAOB argued that because the Board members are inferior
officers controlled by the SEC, "Congress can grant department heads sole
authority to remove the inferior officers they appoint. That traditional
arrangement does not undermine the President's executive power; it merely
requires him to supervise inferior officers in customary 'chain of command'
fashion." 2 15 First, analysis of the Supreme Court decision in Free Enterprise
reveals its failure to correct the Board's fundamental flaws. Second, in light
of the Supreme Court's decision and recalling the initial inquiry of this
Comment,2 16 perhaps it is now appropriate to go beyond the Free Enterprise
case 217 to address whether the Board, and agencies like it in the future, can
find a practical, accountable equilibrium.2 18 Congress's intent and the
Board's nature indicate the Board could accomplish its purposes more
effectively if placed under executive authority.
214. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 167, at 7. The following quotation represents the application
of the Fund's constitutional philosophy:
In short, by making the Board "independent" of both the legislature's budget
responsibilities and the President's duty to execute the laws, Congress has bestowed on
itself power without responsibility and denied the people any ability to correct
improvident law enforcement. Since no elected representative is involved in appointing
or removing Board members, or reviewing the Board's budget, taxation or enforcement
policies, no amount of public disapproval can be converted into replacing Board
members or reforming any misguided policies. The Act's gratuitous and unprecedented
effort to immunize government power from public accountability, by creating a "Fifth
Branch" of government neither appointed nor removable by the President, therefore
violates every basic precept of separated powers.
Id. at 10. The petitioner's reasoning echoes advocacy for the unitary Executive, as represented in a
few of the amicus briefs submitted on behalf of the petitioner. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief on the
Merits of Mountain States Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioners, supra note 165, at 12, 17
("The protection of the executive power requires vesting all such power in one person, the President
.... The concept of independent agencies, plural bodies of persons wielding executive power, over
whom the President exercises little if any control or supervision, is anathema to the structure of the
Constitution."); Brief of Amicus Curiae The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional
Jurisprudence in Support of Petitioners, supra note 165, at 18 ("The Framers vested executive
authority in the President for purposes of unity, consistency, and accountability.").
215. Brief for Respondents, supra note 14, at 12.
216. See supra p. 103.
217. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners, supra note 167, at 8 ("Congress had no overriding need or
even legitimate reason to upset the Constitution's balance of powers; the only reason for not
authorizing Presidential appointment and removal, as is done with every other independent agency,
was Congress' gratuitous desire to reduce 'the level of Presidential control' that the Executive
exercises over traditional independent agencies.").
218. This concern might best be conveyed through the sentiments of the law professors writing as
amicus for the petitioners:
As law professors who have studied and written about the massive accounting and
corporate governance scandals that prompted the passage of the Act, we applauded
Congress's decision to establish a new independent regulator to oversee the conduct of
the auditors of public companies. We have been concerned, however, that the particular
design chosen by Congress accorded the PCAOB substantial discretion and autonomy
without imposing constitutionally sufficient accountability.
Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners, supra note 165, at 1.
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A. The Supreme Court's Decision Did Not Resolve the Issue ofExecutive
Control Over the Board
The crux of the Supreme Court's ruling is that "two layers [of
removability] are not the same as one." 2 19 The majority opinion simplifies
the Board's flaw to a basic scenario, arguing that because the Board
members can only be removed for good cause, the SEC cannot remove them
at will, and the President in turn "cannot hold the Commission fully
accountable for the Board's conduct, to the same extent that he may hold the
Commission accountable for everything else that it does."220 Conversely, if
the Board members are removable at will, then "the Commission has no
excuse for retaining an officer who is not faithfully executing the law." 221
The majority concludes that the President will be able to keep the Board
accountable if the SEC can remove its members at will-changing two
layers back to a constitutional one.222
On a practical level, however, removing the Board's good-cause tenure
will not solve the problem that the majority identifies. The members still
lack a constitutionally necessary connection to the President.223 For
example, in Morrison, the President could sufficiently control the
independent counsel's actions because the counsel was removed for cause
by the Attorney General, who was then removable at will by the
President.224 In the same way, members of the FTC in Humphrey's
Executor were removable only for cause, but the President could exert direct
influence over them through his Appointment Power,225 and the members
primarily functioned as judicial or legislative aides rather than executive
officers.226 In contrast, the PCAOB primarily creates and enforces all
auditing standards,227 two basic executive agency functions.228 Under the
219. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3157.
220. Id. at 3153-54.
221. Id. at 3154 n.4.
222. Id. at 3157.
223. A formalistic understanding of executive power requires the Executive to exercise some form
of control over his subordinates. See id. at 3151 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1). "As Madison
stated on the floor of the First Congress, 'if any power whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is the
power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws."' Id (citation
omitted). The dissent argues instead that "[t]he functional approach required by our precedents
recognizes . . . administrative complexity and, more importantly, recognizes the various ways
presidential power operates within this context-and the various ways in which a removal provision
might affect that power." Id at 3169 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The precedential power of the
majority's formalism will guide this discussion.
224. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 688-92 (1988).
225. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625-26 (1935).
226. Id. at 628.
227. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
228. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3155. The Court explains, "[b]y granting the Board executive
power within the Executive's oversight, this Act subverts the President's ability to ensure that the
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majority's decision, the Board is neither accountable to the President
through the judgment of a removable alter ego, nor is it accountable as a
quasi-judicial agency whose members the President appoints. 229 The Board
remains in a constitutional no man's land.230
The Chief Justice acknowledges this very distinction between the Board
and Morrison. "In those cases . . . only one level of protected tenure
separated the President from an officer exercising executive power. It was
the President-or a subordinate he could remove at will-who decided
whether the officer's conduct merited removal under the good-cause
standard." 231  Rather than acting on this observation, however, the majority
opinion reverts to an oversimplification. It presumes, without clear
evidence, that the SEC will respond to the President's wishes regarding the
removal of Board members.232 As Justice Breyer shrewdly points out in the
dissent, "If the President confronts a Commission that seeks to resist his
policy preferences-a distinct possibility when, as here, a Commission's
membership must reflect both political parties[-] . . . the restriction on the
Commission's ability to remove a Board member is ... irrelevant....
As a result, by changing the Board members to be removable at will, the
majority's decision does not practically change the PCAOB's relationship to
the President.234
In the end, the majority's ruling nullifies its own political philosophy:
The President has been given the power to oversee executive
officers; he is not limited, as in Harry Truman's lament, to
"persuad[ing]" his unelected subordinates "to do what they ought to
do without persuasion." In its pursuit of a "workable government,"
Congress cannot reduce the Chief Magistrate to a cajoler-in-chief.235
laws are faithfully executed-as well as the public's ability to pass judgment on his efforts." Id.
(emphasis added).
229. Cf Morrison, 487 U.S. at 688-92; Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 625-26.
230. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. Judge Kavanaugh makes a similar argument in
his dissenting opinion, noting that even if the SEC can control the Board's members as "inferior
officers," the President has no ability to control the SEC as an alter ego Department Head. Free
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 686-87 (D.C. Cir. 2008), affd in
part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
231. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3155 (emphasis added).
232. Id. at 3154 n.4. The Chief Justice decries the second layer of tenure because it "matters
precisely when the President finds it necessary to have a subordinate officer removed, and a statute
prevents him from doing so." Id
233. Id. at 3171 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Under 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a), the SEC Commissioners must
reflect both political parties. Id.
234. Note that the majority's decision on the issue of removal power connects directly to its
decision on appointment power. The Court ruled the SEC is a Department that can appoint PCAOB
members because "[t]he Commission is a freestanding component of the Executive Branch, not
subordinate to or contained within any other such component ..... Id. at 3163. If this is the case,
however, the President's lack of control over the "department head" of the SEC only highlights its
uncontrollability and deep contrast with the Attorney General's position in Morrison.
235. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3157 (citation omitted).
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By leaving the Board under the removable-for-good-cause authority of
the SEC, the Court forces the President to persuade the SEC and the Board
to execute the laws as he wishes. The Board, as it stands after the Court's
decision, still violates separation of powers.2 36  Additionally, as discussed
below, the Board's at-will removability under the SEC, as a kind of sub-
agency, will not likely give the President more control or ensure additional
accountability. 237
B. Independence of the PCAOB Leaves Room for Executive Control
Whether or not the Supreme Court successfully rehabilitated the Board,
its structure is not optimal. At a fundamental level, both sides in the Free
Enterprise case agree that financial regulation serves an important purpose
and should be carried out through non-biased channels.238 Even more
significantly, although proponents of the Board argued for its
constitutionality in opposition to the unitary Executive,239 they argued for its
independence only in opposition to the industry. 240  The Council of
Institutional Investors argued for the respondent that the Board must
236. As the Court itself recognizes, the constitutional mechanism separating powers prevents "[a]
diffusion of accountability." Id. at 3155. It continues, "Without a clear and effective chain of
command, the public cannot 'determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious
measure, or series of pernicious measures ought really to fall."' Id. Leaving the Board as a vaguely
independent sub-chapter of the SEC leaves it insulated from the President's control.
237. See infra Part IV.C.2.
238. E.g., Brief for the Cato Institute et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note
165, at 28 (recognizing independent agencies such as the SEC and the Federal Reserve play a
significant role in preserving market participant confidence through a depoliticized process of
regulation); Brief for Amici Curiae Former Chairmen of the Securities and Exchange Commission in
Support of Respondents, supra note 165, at 12 (quoting Senator Sarbanes, who explained that the
auditing industry's failure to self-regulate responsibly was "obviously one of the reasons we are
moving, in [the Sarbanes-Oxlcy] legislation, to an independent public company accounting oversight
board."); see also supra note 196 and accompanying text.
239. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 14, at 35-36 ("Petitioners claim that Congress violated
separation-of-powers principles by giving the SEC rather than the President authority to remove
Board members. But the settled rule since the Framing has been that, when Congress grants a
department head authority to appoint its own subordinates, Congress can also grant the department
head sole authority to remove them."). The respondents essentially argue that the unitary Executive
is an unrealistic application of the appointment and removal powers. See id.
240. See id. at 1-7; see also Brief of the Council of Institutional Investors et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, supra note 165, at 6 ("The PCAOB's independence from the industry it is
charged with regulating is key to its effectiveness. So is its accountability to the SEC and the
investing public. The PCAOB's essential powers to promulgate auditing and other rules, inspect
accounting firms to assure quality audits, and sanction improper auditor conduct are dependent on
both its independence from the industry and its accountability to the SEC."); Brief for Amici Curiae
Former Chairmen of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Support of Respondents, supra
note 165, at 13 ("Congress borrowed from the financial system's existing regulatory institutions and
long tradition of public-private partnership, while adding even greater safeguards to make the new
board more independent from the accounting profession than existing SROs [self-regulatory
organizations] were with respect to the elements of the securities industry they oversaw.").
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maintain its independence from the industry because the accounting scandals
of the last two decades illustrate that the industry needs governmental
enforcement rather than self-regulation.241  The respondent also pointed out
"[t]he 'independence' Congress sought was independence from the
accounting profession, not the SEC."242 Notably, such intentions leave the
door open for the Board's reconciliation with the Executive Branch.243
C. Congress Mistakenly Rejected Alternative Designs
The intended industry independence of the Board subsequently begs the
question of why Congress chose such a constitutionally questionable244
design in the first place. Former Chairmen of the SEC 245 writing as amici
for the respondent seek to answer this question. 24 6  "Congress considered
two polar alternatives that lie on either side of the structure it ultimately
enacted: to create a new, independent agency altogether, or to create a new
unit within the SEC." 247 Yet Congress did not adopt either of these options
because, the amici explain, witnesses warned members against the
alternatives during hearings prior to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act.248 Unfortunately, evidence now suggests that the PCAOB has fallen, or
will fall, into the pitfalls Congress hoped to avoid.
241. See Brief of the Council of Institutional Investors et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, supra note 165, at 12-13.
242. Brief for Respondents, supra note 14, at 28. On a side note, the appointment process for the
Board was also politically driven (like Congress's reaction to the financial scandals), but for
different reasons. At the time of the Act's passage, some Republicans recognized that President
Bush could not politically afford to be linked to industry favoritism by any potential appointments to
the Board. See Keefe, supra note 163, at 1672; see also Richard L. Berke, Enron's Collapse: The
Strategist; Associates of Bush Aide Say He Helped Strategist Win an Enron Contract, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 2002, at Cl. Thus, Republicans pushed to vest the appointment powers in the SEC. Keefe,
supra note 163, at 1672.
243. See supra Part IV.B.
244. This is not necessarily meant to imply support for the petitioners in Free Enterprise. Rather,
the Supreme Court might deem the issue constitutionally questionable simply by virtue of
consideration. And, as discussed in supra Part IV.A, the Supreme Court's ruling on the Board may
not resolve all of the constitutional issues surrounding it.
245. Including the following: G. Bradford Cook (1973), Roderick M. Hills (1975-1977), Harold
M. Williams (1977-1981), David S. Ruder (1987-1989), Arthur Levitt, Jr. (1993-2001), Harvey L.
Pitt (2001-2003), and William Donaldson (2003-2005). Brief for Amici Curiae Former Chairmen
of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Support of Respondents, supra note 165, at 1.
246. Amici argue essentially that Congress had no choice but to structure the PCAOB as a
compromise between traditional but unworkable alternatives. See id. at 30-34.
247. Id. at 17.
248. Id. at 17 (citing H.R. 3763, The Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and
Transparency Act of 2002: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong., at 158-59).
Concerns voiced during the hearings included possible "turf wars" between a new agency and the
SEC, or insufficient funding and manpower for the SEC to regulate auditing through a newly created
sub-entity. Id. at 17-18. Note that the Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and
Transparency Act of 2002 ("CAARTA") is the direct predecessor of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and
was originally introduced into the House by Rep. Michael Oxley. Keefe, supra note 163, at 1672.
Notwithstanding this evidence, the Court muses, "Neither respondents nor the dissent explains why
the Board's task, unlike so many others, requires more than one layer of insulation from the
President-or, for that matter, why only two." Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3157.
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1. Independent Agency Status
For example, former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden testified that if
Congress created a separate independent agency for auditing controls, its
agenda would overlap with the SEC and lead to conflict and inefficiency.249
Yet in the current relationship between the PCAOB and the SEC,
compliance costs for some firms increased to over $1.7 million per year in
2007.250 For the average company, compliance costs for section 404 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 251 have now risen to $2.3 million per year.25 2 This is
due largely to a duplicative regulatory burden.253 For example, as bill co-
author Michael Oxley explained, the Board's 330 pages of regulations on the
"internal controls" of publicly traded companies parallel existing banking
regulations enforced by the SEC. 254  In-house controllers and accountants
face similar issues.255  According to the Institute of Management
Accountants, "[t]he SEC and the PCAOB have issue[d] two sets of guidance
rules to perform the same assessment task . .. resulting in unnecessary
confusion and complexity for management." 25 6  Though the SEC
procedurally oversees the PCAOB,257 the Board ultimately lacks policy
incentives to coordinate its regulations and enforcement with the goals of the
SEC.
249. Id
250. Larry E. Ribstein & Henry N. Butler, Where Was SOX?, FORBES, Dec. 22, 2008, at 28.
251. Section 404 addresses requirements for internal controls over company bookkeeping.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 404. The PCAOB is charged with implementing the section 404
controls. See Freeman, supra note 15.
252. Freeman, supra note 15.
253. Brief for the Cato Institute et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 165, at
24-26.
254. Stephen Taub, Oxley: I'm Not Happy With Sarbox, CFO.coM (Apr. 6, 2007) (quoting Rep.
Michael Oxley, former House Financial Services Committee Chairman) ("For banks, it is an
unnecessary regulatory burden [in addition to those] they are already complying with.") cited in
Brief for the Cato Institute et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 165, at 24.
255. Brief for the Cato Institute et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 165, at
25.
256. Press Release, IMA Responds to SEC and PCAOB Exposure Drafts on SOX: Much More Is
Needed to Get It Right (Feb. 27, 2007) cited in Brief for the Cato Institute et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, supra note 165, at 25.
257. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 14, at 16.
258. This is supported by an examination of Congress's own inspiration for the Board, the self-
regulating organizations (SROs). See Brief for the United States at 2-3, Free Enter. Fund v. Public
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (No. 08-861), 2009 WL 3290435. The SRO
model puts government agencies in a "residual role" while the securities exchanges take place under
SRO oversight. See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (James Allen ed., 1940),
cited in Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 352 (1963).
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2. Sub-Agency Status
Congress rejected another alternative, the creation of a sub-agency
within the SEC, because the SEC did not have the resources to regulate
auditing through such a sub-agency.2 5 9  Yet now, as a non-sub-agency
removable-at-will,2 60 the PCAOB's resources could outpace the SEC but
still face the same limitations that the SEC suffers. 261 Because the Board
262lacks in-depth financial oversight, its source of revenue may not sustain
its operations efficiently.
By their nature, agencies tend to aggrandize their institutional interests
by increasing their budget while decreasing their responsibilities. 26 3  This
tendency becomes all the more conflated in the Board's power to raise
revenues through taxation of public companies. 26 The Board can increase
its budget as it sees fit without needing to account for its spending or
equalize marginal cost and marginal benefit. 265  Even with the power to set
and raise its own budget, the Board now faces significant budgetary
demands.266 For example, the Board holds the responsibility to regulate
international accounting firms that audit U.S. companies.267 In its rollout of
international regulation, the costs of time and travel are already draining the
259. Brief for Amici Curiae Former Chairmen of the Securities and Exchange Commission in
Support of Respondents, supra note 165, at 17. See also H.R. 3763, The Corporate and Auditing
Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002: Hearings Before the H Comm. on
Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. at 158-59. The hearings noted problems with insufficient funding and
manpower when the SEC regulated auditing through the PCAOB as a sub-entity, which is why
Congress rejected the idea. Brief for Amici Curiae Former Chairmen of the Securities and Exchange
Commission in Support of Respondents, supra note 165, at 18.
260. Under the Supreme Court's decision, the Board remains in place but its members must be
removable at-will by the SEC Commissioners. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3161.
261. Brief for Amici Curiae Former Chairmen of the Securities and Exchange Commission in
Support of Respondents, supra note 165 at 17 (citing HR. 3763, The Corporate and Auditing
Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on
Fin. Sers., 107th Cong. at 158-59).
262. The Board sets it own budget and funds itself with the fees it charges auditing companies. 15
U.S.C. § 7219(b) (2006). The SEC possesses technical approval power but is not involved in the
development of the Board's financial agenda. Id.
263. See generally WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT (1971); William A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO PUBLIC
CHOICE 264 (2001).
264. See 15 U.S.C. § 7219(b)-(d) (2006).
265. This reasoning rises from the understanding that "[t]he bureaucrat, like everyone else, can be
assumed to be a selfish utility maximizer." DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 360 (2003).
Famed sociologist Max Weber applied this assumption and found that bureaucrats naturally strive to
obtain power. Id. This goal of power can be directly compared to the businessman's pursuit of
profit. Id. at 362; see also id. at 365-67. In particular, the non-pecuniary goals of an independent
agency can be translated into leverage through bargaining power. As Mueller notes, the agency is
able to inflate its budget against the wishes of its institutional sponsor because "(1) the bureau is a
monopolist supplier, (2) it alone knows its true cost schedule, and (3) it is institutionally allowed to
make take-it-or-leave-it budget proposals." Id. at 365.
266. See Brief for the Cato Institute et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note
165, at 18-19.
267. See 15 U.S.C. § 7216.
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Board's resources.268 The Board's budget in 2007 exceeded $136 million,269
as compared to the SEC's $100 million budget for its entire corporate
finance division in 2007.270 In 2009, the Board members each received an
annual salary of $547,000 and the chairmen received $673,000.271 Without
a limit on its budget or salaries, the Board possesses little incentive to rein in
costs or promote efficiency within the agency.272
Amici to the respondent explain that if the Board had been set within the
SEC, the system would have lost "the long-recognized benefits of the SRO
structure." 27 3  These touted benefits stem from the "ability to attract and
retain experienced professionals focused on specific policy priorities and
able to provide their own expert advice."274 By infusing the SRO structure
with public-minded government authority, Congress hoped to preserve the
benefits of the SROs while skirting the previously exploited flaws of the
system.275
Despite this hope, the Board cannot be independent from the industry
without being dependent on the government structure.276 The irony of the
Board's current situation is that its proponents must argue the SEC possesses
wide plenary authority over it277 while still insisting that the Board should
remain a separate, quasi-private agency.278 Essentially, Congress wanted to
268. Brief for the Cato Institute et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 165, at
19.
269. PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD, PCAOB 2007 BUDGET 22, http:l/www.
pcaobus.org/About/Ops/Documents/Annual%20Reports/2007.pdf
270. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, FISCAL 2007 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET REQUEST 26 (Feb.
2006), http://www.sec.gov/about/secfy07budgetreq.pdf.
271. See Ian Katz, Sarbanes-Oxley Auditing Board Chairman Olson Resigns, BLOOMBERG (June
8, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aXflsnBpiwzA.
272. See supra note 262 and accompanying text; see also Brief for the Cato Institute et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 165, at 11-12.
273. Brief for Amici Curiae Former Chairmen of the Securities and Exchange Commission in
Support of Respondents, supra note 165, at 18 (citing Accounting Reform and Investor Protection:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 532
(2002) (statement of NASD Chairman Glauber)).
274. Id. at 18-19.
275. See Brief of the Council of Institutional Investors et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, supra note 165, at 18.
276. This dichotomy makes sense in the context of economic law enforcement. If an entity no
longer derives its power from peer review and self-regulation, it can only draw power from a body
with greater enforcement power over the market-namely, the U.S. government. See id. at 23-24.
In its last days, the predecessor of the PCAOB, the Public Oversight Board (POB) of the AICPA,
called for a legislative replacement where "all critical elements of regulation-including all standard
setting, inspections and reviews of accounting firms, enforcement and discipline, and other
functions-be placed under the aegis of a single regulator operating under statutory authority." Id.
at 23.
277. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 14, at 49.
278. Id.; see also Brief of the Council of Institutional Investors et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, supra note 165, at 16.
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attract experienced, competent regulators for the auditing industry
without the administrative or budgetary constraints endured by the
typical independent agency.2 79 Such a goal is laudable but perversely
optimistic because the Board has almost no political incentive to regulate
in the general public interest as defined by the electoral process.280
Given the shortcomings of the Board, policymakers should consider
alternative structures regardless of the Supreme Court's ruling on the
case. 28 1 In the end, the constitutional questions engulfing the Board 28 2
should encourage reform rather than passive deference to the reasoning
of the Court. 283
D. Precedent and Policy Arguments Support Executive Control of the
PCAOB
When considering an alternative structure for the Board, it is important
to keep in mind Congress focused on insuring the Board's industry
279. See supra Part IV.A.
280. In a perfect world, an independent bureaucracy could enforce government policy for the
public interest with swift efficiency. Congress's attempt, however, ignores the nature of a
bureaucracy. See supra note 265 and accompanying text. Without the threat of at-will removal or
electoral backlash from the Executive, agencies are shaped instead by the special interests
motivating their congressional authors. See Mathew D. McCubbins, et al., Administrative
Procedures as Instruments ofPolitical Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987). Taking it on the
abstract, if a bureaucracy strives to gain power, and its power structure is defined by congressional
perpetuation and support, then the bureaucracy will only look to protect the public interests that will
in turn feed the interests of its current congressional supporters. In essence, "[a]gencies are
insulated precisely because those who create them do not want them held accountable by tomorrow's
authorities." Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 1, 6; see also JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY Do IT 72-90 (1989). Wilson discusses four kinds of
political environments occupied by government agencies: "[The agency] can confront (1) a dominant
interest group favoring its goals; (2) a dominant interest group hostile to its goals; (3) two or more
rival interest groups in conflict over its goals; or (4) no important interest group." WILSON, supra, at
76. Most likely, the PCAOB falls into the second category, defined by Wilson as "entrepreneurial
politics" where the "costs are heavily concentrated on some industry . . . but the benefits are spread
over many if not all people. Because costs have a high per-capita value, the affected group has a
strong incentive to oppose the proposed law." Id. at 77. The PCAOB fits this definition because its
sanctions and compliance costs most heavily affect auditors and public companies though its policies
benefit U.S. investors on the whole. Wilson describes the threats facing such an agency:
[M]any of the founding members of the new agency will be drawn from the social
movement that helped to create it and they will have the aid of watchdog groups
composed of political allies. For a while these forces will be able to fend off the
pressures of the cost-bearing interest and even to impart a degree of regulatory zeal to the
agency's work. But such an agency will be very much at risk: when the zeal of their
early allies flags, it may find itself confronting an environment where much of the
information it needs and many of the political resources to which it must respond will be
in the hands of an interest fundamentally hostile to its purposes.
Id. at 77-78.
281. See infra Part IV.B.
282. See supra Part III.
283. While deference to the Court is of course important, Congress should recognize that a ruling
in favor of the constitutionality of the Board does not necessarily endorse its structure as effective.
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independence, not independence from the Executive.2" It thus does not
conflict with Congress's intent to argue for increased executive oversight
of the Board.2 85  Moreover, such an increase may be the most effective
way to ensure political accountability and support for the Board's
policies.286
The Board's functions should not necessarily limit executive
oversight. As defined by past cases, 2 87 the Board is responsible for quasi-
legislative288 and executive functions.289 Yet these definitions show only
what triggers appointment or removal power,290 not what will actually
ensure better policy. The separation-of-powers principles laid down by the
Court speak more directly to this normative question. 29' Throughout its
284. See Brief for Amici Curiae Former Chairmen of the Securities and Exchange Commission
in Support of Respondents, supra note 165, at 22-24; see also supra note 240 and accompanying
text. In addition, amicus for the respondent essentially concede that the Board could still function
with an altered structure. See Brief of National Association of State Boards of Accountancy as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 165, at 27-28 ("[I]f the [C]ourt does find
any of these provisions to be unconstitutional, it is imperative that the PCAOB nevertheless be
permitted to continue to function."). Though it is true Congress also hoped the Board would be
independent of "constituent pressures," there is little indication that its somewhat quixotic
insulation inside the SEC is necessary to maintain distance from such pressures. See supra note
147 and accompanying text
285. Cf Brief for Amici Curiae Former Chairmen of the Securities and Exchange Commission
in Support of Respondents, supra note 165, at 22-24; Brief of National Association of State
Boards of Accountancy as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 165, at 27-28.
In other words, "independence from the executive" is glaringly absent from the predominant
justifications for the Board's structure. Rather, the primary concern appeared to be independence
from the industry. See Brief for Amici Curiae Former Chairmen of the Securities and Exchange
Commission in Support of Respondents, supra note 165, at 22-24; Brief of National Association
of State Boards of Accountancy as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 165, at
27-28. As a result, reintroducing executive control over the Board does not conflict with
Congress's initial intentions.
286. For a notional perspective on the support necessary for an agency like the Board, see
supra note 242 and accompanying text.
287. See discussion of Morrison and Edmond, supra, Part II.
288. The Board is empowered to create regulations and levy taxes to support its budget. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 7213(a)(1), 7219(b)-(d) (2006). Such functions constitutionally fall into the category
of legislative power. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (giving Congress the power to levy taxes and to
make all laws necessary and proper to the execution of the powers vested in the government).
For a discussion of the non-delegation non-doctrine relating to this issue, see supra note 73 and
accompanying text.
289. The Board's other functions (investigations, inspections, and subsequent sanctions for
violations) all fall into the constitutional category of executive power. See U.S. CONST. art. 11, §§
1, 3; see also Springer v. Gov't of Phil. Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928) ("Legislative power, as
distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them or
appoint the agents charged with the duty of such enforcement. The latter are executive
functions.").
290. See supra Part 1I (discussing the development of the appointment and removal power tests
in Supreme Court precedent).
291. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3157 (2010).
The respondent in Free Enterprise recognizes that the "Court has repeatedly and properly
emphasized the indispensable role of separation of powers in preserving individual liberty."
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precedent,2 92 the Supreme Court has consistently recognized that
separation of powers preserves individual liberty.293 Under these
principles, the President is most capable of ensuring the Board's actions
will preserve individual liberty while effectively executing Congress's
intentions.294
1. Increase in Voter Confidence
First, looking to the Board's enforcement responsibilities, presidential
control of the Board could increase the confidence of American investors
by linking the decisions of the Board back to an elected representative. 295
Despite the respondent's focus on the Board's functions, the reality is that
voters recognize form over function-that is, they elect or oust the
officials who are formally responsible for particular government actions. 296
Under the Supreme Court's ruling, the members of the Board can only be
removed by the SEC, whose members in turn can only be removed for
cause by the President.297 Such insulation eliminates accountability to the
voters for the Board's discretionary decisions because the SEC, not the
President, is responsible for the Board's actions.29 8 In its current structure,
Brief for Respondents, supra note 14, at 35. Given this acknowledgement, "better policy" might
be most easily measured by the ways in which it preserves individual liberty. See Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 119 (1976) ("separation of powers ... is at the heart of our Constitution");
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) ("Madison, in writing about the principle of
separated powers, said: 'No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value or is stamped with
the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty."' (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra
note 2, at 324 (James Madison))).
292. See supra Part II.
293. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988) ("Time and again we have reaffirmed the
importance in our constitutional scheme of the separation of governmental powers into the three
coordinate branches."); see, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 138-39 (1926);
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714, 730 (1986); Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 884 (1991); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 122; INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (2001).
294. See infra Part IV.B.
295. See Brief of Amicus Curiae The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional
Jurisprudence in Support of Petitioners, supra note 165, at 18 ("The Framers vested executive
authority in the President for purposes of unity, consistency, and accountability."). Looking to
the work of legal historian James Kent, amici for the petitioners recognize that "[u]nity increases
not only the efficacy, but the responsibility, of the executive power. Every act can be
immediately traced and brought home to the proper agent. There can be no concealment of the
real author, nor, generally, of the motives of public measures . . . ." JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 291 (Oliver Wendell Holmes, ed., Rothman & Co., 12th ed.
1989) (1873), cited in Brief of Amicus Curiae The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional
Jurisprudence in Support of Petitioners, supra note 165, at 17.
296. The logic of this point flows from the basic principles of representative democracy. In a
presidential system, the President is directly accountable to the voters, who place their demands
on the government and reward responsive policymaking with political support. See Bernhard
Webels, Political Representation and Democracy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL
BEHAVIOR 834 (Russell J. Dalton & Hans-Dieter Klingemann eds., 2007).
297. See supra Part Ill.
298. In this case, the base definition of accountability is whether someone can lose his job for
making the wrong decision. The Supreme Court has implicitly recognized the removal power as
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the Board has already created unprecedented compliance costs 299 and
unintended deterrence of public companies.300 Putting the PCAOB back
under the control of the President would bring a voice to impacted voters
and encourage institutional effectiveness.301
2. Preservation of Expertise and Accountability
Second, executive control over the PCAOB would mitigate Congress's
concerns over the Board's industry expertise and budgetary needs.302 In
the same manner that the President appoints competent Federal Reserve
Chairmen, 303 SEC Commissioners, 3 and even Supreme Court Justices,30s
Congress could retain the power to vet appointments to the Board for their
the application of this principle. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757-58 (1996)
(recognizing that the Constitution gave specific powers like appointment and removal to the
Executive Branch, "allow[ing] the citizen to know who may be called to answer for making, or
not making, those delicate and necessary decisions essential to governance"); Myers, 272 U.S. at
117 (holding the President's removal powers are essential for upholding his responsibilities to the
public). Keep in mind that the SEC is still an independent agency. If members of the SEC are
still removable only for cause, then they have no exterior accountability for their oversight of the
Board.
299. See supra Part IV.C.I.
300. Increasingly, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its section 404 internal-control regulations
(imposed by the PCAOB) have led to companies choosing to remain private rather than incur the
compliance costs of going public. See Peter J. Wallison, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Ebbers
Conviction, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLIcY RESEARCH, 4 (June 2005),
http://www.aei.org/docLib/ 20050610_FSOJuneg.pdf.
301. As political theorists Terry Moe and Scott Wilson explain:
Unlike legislators, presidents are held responsible by the public for virtually every
aspect of national performance. When the economy declines, an agency falters, or a
social problem goes unaddressed, it is the president who gets the blame, and whose
popularity and historical legacy are on the line. All presidents are aware of this, and
they respond by trying to build an institutional capacity for effective governance. As a
result, they are the only players in the politics of structural choice who are motivated
to seek a unified, coordinated, centrally directed bureaucratic system.
Moe & Wilson, supra note 280, at 11 (footnote omitted). The Court invokes this same principle
as it quotes James Madison:
[T]he Framers sought to ensure that those who are employed in the execution of the
law will be in their proper situation, and the chain of dependence be preserved; the
lowest officers, the middle grade, and the highest, will depend, as they ought, on the
President, and the President on the community.
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3155 (2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
302. This suggestion does not directly controvert any of the arguments considered by the
majority in Free Enterprise. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
303. See The Structure of the Federal Reserve System, FED. RESERVE BD., http://www.federal
reserve.gov/pubs/frseries/frseri.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2011).
304. See Current SEC Commissioners, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/about/
commissioner.shtml (last visited Jan. 6, 2011).
305. See A Brief Overview of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., htp://www.
supremecourt.gov/about/briefoverview.aspx (last visited Jan. 6, 2011).
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expertise without cutting off presidential influence.306 It is understandable
that the Board's original insulation from presidential appointment was
motivated in part by a desire to protect the President from public
scrutiny. 307  The appointment process is often personalized to hold
presidents responsible for "every action or decision made in their name or
on behalf of those (such as the nominees) aligned with them." 308 Yet this
impulse to protect the President runs contrary to his role in the federal
system "to ensure both vigor and accountability" 309 by openly maintaining
control over executive functions.31 o Such oversight also protects the
decisions of the independent agency from partisan reproach.3 11 As former
FTC Chairman Calvin Collier noted, independent agencies "'have no
lifeline to the White House. [They] are naked before Congress, without
protection there."' 3 12  Executive control over the Board would preserve
individual liberty by linking policies back to an elected official while
avoiding factional pressures.
It is true that the Board must ensure competitive salaries to draw
industry talent.3 13 Yet the Board's budget and its levied fees do not rely on
its independence from executive power.314 On the contrary, the respondent
in Free Enterprise particularly emphasized the SEC's approval power over
the Board's budget315  and the Board's allocation, assessment, and
collection of support fees.316 Ultimately, the fee and budget structure of
the Board need not change if placed more directly under executive
authority.3 17 Congress's concerns for the Board's functionality would not
306. The Senate has the power to impose criteria for the occupants of particular federal offices
informally, if not potentially formally. See GERHARDT, supra note 97, at 153-57.
307. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
308. GERHARDT, supra note 97, at 83.
309. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997).
310. Strauss, supra note 62, at 592.
311. See Calvin Collier, Remarks at the Assembly of the Administrative Conference of the
United States, Washington D.C. (Dec. 15, 1983), quoted in Strauss, supra note 62, at 592 &
n.75).
312. Id.
313. See S. REP. No. 107-205, at 7 (2002) ("The bill makes it plain, as the Committee intends,
that the Board is to provide for staff salaries that are fully competitive with those for comparable
private-sector self-regulatory, accounting, technical, supervisory, or related staff or management
positions.").
314. The taxation power of the Board is not predicated on its independence. See 15 U.S.C. §
7219(cHd) (2006).
315. Brief for Respondents, supra note 14, at 7 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7219(b)).
316. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7219(d)).
317. A possible constitutional challenge to this structure might rise under the nondelegation
doctrine, but the claim was not pursued in Free Enterprise beyond the trial level and would not
likely succeed considering Supreme Court precedent on the issue. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub.
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 670 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2008), affd in part, rev'd in part,
and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010); Keefe, supra note 163, at 1676 n.194; see also supra note
78 and accompanying text; compare ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 328-31 (3d ed. 2006), with Nagy, supra note 18, at 1050-60 (addressing the
possibility of a nondelegation challenge).
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be significantly disrupted by executive control.318 Instead, presidential
oversight would heighten the effectiveness of the Board by coordinating its
role with other agencies and bringing much-needed public transparency to
the auditor-regulation process. 319 Formal separation of powers and respect
for the unitary Executive 320 offer stability and accountability for the Board.
V. CONCLUSION
Even if the unitary Executive still walks the halls of the West Wing, 321
the Supreme Court has recognized his constitutional existence without
protecting his constitutional power.322 The Court's precedent has shaped
the President's appointment and removal powers with significant deference
to the will of Congress. 323 Despite this, the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board challenges the stature of the Executive Branch in a new324
and ultimately unnecessary way. 325 Though the Supreme Court's decision
failed to correct the Board's flaws, Congress and the public should sit up
and take notice of the Board's questionable structure. The unitary
Executive does not always threaten; it can in fact support the mission of
independent agencies by providing political accountability.32 6
The independence of the Board would not be compromised by
executive oversight because it would remain independent from the industry
it regulates.327 Instead, many of the Board's current problems might be
corrected by increasing voter confidence and by preserving its expertise
and budget through executive oversight.328 Though separation of powers
may split between formal and functional understandings, supporting
318. The arguments of the respondent and its amici bear this point out by emphasizing the
SEC's already pervasive supervision of the Board and suggesting that the Board could still
function if the Court excised its constitutionally-offending aspects. See Brief for Respondents,
supra note 14, at 15-16; Brief of National Association of State Boards of Accountancy as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 165, at 27-28.
319. See Brief for the Cato Institute et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note
165, at 12; see also supra Part IV.A-B.
320. These two concepts are most notably and effectively combined in Justice Scalia's
dissenting opinion in Morrison. See generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-734 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
321. See PRESIDENTIAL POWER, supra note 7, at 418-19.
322. See supra Part IV.A.
323. See, e.g., Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997); Morrison, 487 U.S. 654; supra
Part II.
324. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 686 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), affd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3138
(2010).
325. See supra Part IV.B.
326. See supra Part IV.
327. See supra Part IV.A.
328. See supra Part IV.B.1-2.
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political accountability of independent agencies is good governance.329
And should the Board's reform fail? The unitary Executive stands
responsible to the voters. The Board and its inevitable progeny could
serve the people most in the accountable hands of the President. Even the
Free Enterprise decision recognizes this much. 3 o
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